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Abstract
Transition decisions in the labor market such as career, work, and human capital
accumulation entail long term economic consequences, yet are difficult to make under
the risk of skill-job mismatch. In this dissertation, I explore the choice mechanism for
occupations and how this choice is related with the wealth and income of the decision
maker.
In the first essay, I examine a channel between wealth and earnings inequality.
Selecting into occupations that appropriately match their skills can lead to higher
earnings levels for workers. Yet risk averse workers might be reluctant to experiment
and to discover their highest earnings potential by moving between jobs because of
the downside risk involved. I provide a model and empirical evidence of how workers
learn about their skills by changing jobs that require different combinations of tasks.
Using the estimated model, I find that the level of initial wealth has a large, long-term
effect in income inequality over the life-cycle.
In the second essay, I report new evidence on why unemployment insurance
(UI) benefits might lengthen job search durations. I examine whether unemployed
ii
individuals with higher levels of wealth search for different kinds of jobs, with different
task levels, than those with lower levels of wealth. I find that an increase in UI benefit
duration allows the unemployed to make larger changes in job-specific tasks relative
to their pre-unemployment jobs.
In the third essay, co-authored with Kyungmin Kang, we ask whether the role of
employer learning varies by worker task type. We build a model in which workers and
firms learn about workers’ multi-dimensional skills from productivity signals, where
signal accuracy depends on a job’s task intensity. We find that employer learning
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Chapter 1
Distributional Effects of Ability
Learning and Career Choice
1.1 Introduction
Selecting the occupation that best matches one’s personal skills allows for best
job performance and is crucial not only for the individual but also for aggregate
productivity within the larger economy. Workers who do not have perfect awareness of
the true nature and level of their skills must learn, generally through the experience of
moving between jobs and observing how their individual performance is compensated
and by observing which types of jobs yield the highest earnings for them. However,
risk-averse workers might be reluctant to experiment with job changes in order to
identify the jobs that would compensate them most highly, and the inefficiencies
resulting from this imperfect information might have greater impacts for workers with
low wealth.
Although the idea of workers learning about their personal ability levels (hereafter
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simply “learning”) has been widely discussed in the literature since Jovanovic (1979),
there has not been much empirical evidence regarding its importance or its existence.
In this paper, I first provide the evidence for skill uncertainty and learning using
reduced-form methods, and I then construct dynamic structural model that accounts
for the benefits of learning in the labor market to analyze its implications for wealth
and income inequality.
To show reduced-form evidence for learning in the labor market, I borrow
Yamaguchi (2012)’s framework to define occupations according to the skill levels
they require in two dimensions, “motor” and “cognitive”. This approach allows us
to observe magnitudes or directions of occupational moves, including whether these
moves represent a climb or a drop on task intensity scales, as well as whether a given
job change is lateral (i.e., moving from a job that requires one type of skill into a
job that requires a different type). Such a framework for examining occupational
change makes it possible to evaluate such changes within a richer context than previ-
ous frameworks have. Previous frameworks have largely grouped occupations into
distinct categories, thus flattening the level of detail available and only permitting
binary observations regarding occupational transition (i.e., did the worker leave one
particular occupation (yes/no) or enter another (yes/no)).
To identify the effect of learning, I assume that workers know the true relationship
between skills and wages but do not know their own skill levels, and that the wage
they receive on a job is equal to their true productivity in the job. They take a
positive (negative) wage realization from a job with a high level of one type of task
2
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intensity to be a signal that they have high (low) skills for performing that task. If
the worker views this signal as reflective of productivity, and if that worker makes
future occupational choices based on it, we should observe a systematic difference
in subsequent job choices between those who receive different signals from jobs of
the same task intensity. Empirically, using panel data from the Longitudinal Survey
of Youth 1979 (hereafter, NLSY79) on wages paid and data from the Dictionary
of Occupational Titles on task intensities of different jobs, I estimate the “signal”
the individual receives from wage residuals on jobs and then observe movements to
different jobs with different intensities as a function of the signal received on a given
job with a particular task intensity. I find that workers who receive a positive signal
about their abilities tend to move up to jobs that use the same skills more intensively,
whereas those who receive unexpectedly low wages are likely to adjust themselves to
new occupations that require different sets of skills.
Based on this reduced-form finding, I then construct a structural career choice
model to analyze the dynamic roles of learning and of initial assets in lifetime earnings.
Workers receive new information about their skills from the wage signal in each period,
and they make occupational choices to maximize their own expected lifetime utility,
taking into account the benefit of learning. Wealth enters the model because people
with low wealth are less likely to take risks due to the probability of sizable utility loss
from taking suboptimal jobs under plausible assumptions such as constant relative
risk aversion or credit constraints. While the model can allow for any finite dimensions
for skills and tasks, I focus on just two dimensions: cognitive and motor skills.
3
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The main difficulty in solving this dynamic optimization problem is the computa-
tional problem that arises because there are large numbers of state and choice variables
for multiple periods of time. My solution algorithm builds on the Endogenous Grid
Method proposed by Carroll (2006). I also use Broyden’s method (Broyden (1965)),
an extension to higher dimensions of the secant method of root finding, in order to
avoid repeatedly evaluating the system of Jacobians, and save computation time by
exploiting secant information instead.
The estimation results display a significant constant relative risk aversion coeffi-
cient, estimated using work history and wealth data from the NLSY79. I find that
there are much larger payoffs for performing one unit of cognitive task compared to
an equivalent unit of motor task. However, the penalty for overshooting a cognitive
task – that is, of choosing a cognitive task that is too high for one’s true ability – is
much larger than it is for motor tasks. Also, the results show that workers start off
with higher uncertainty in motor skills, but that uncertainty resolves faster than it
does for cognitive skills over the life-cycle.
Using the model, I also simulate a proposal for Baby Bonds advanced by a current
Presidential candidate, which is a federally seeded trust fund for every U.S. newborn.
The simulation results imply that supporting young adults in the very beginning
of their entry to the labor market will have a large and long-term effect on income
inequality by, in effect, providing these workers with figurative “insurance” amidst
their process of discovering their comparative advantages within the labor market.
The model’s results imply that this policy will be particularly beneficial for people
4
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with low initial wealth. Annual support of $1,000 for 18 years will increase the income
ratio between bottom 10% and top 10% of initial wealth group by 1.01 percentage
points, and $2,000 will increase it by 5.36 percentage points.
1.2 Relation to the Literature
This paper builds upon two strands of existing literature. The first is the literature
on learning and labor market transitions. The idea of skill uncertainty and learning was
first proposed in the classic matching model by Jovanovic in 1979. In his model, both
workers and employers face uncertainty about workers’ skills and it is only after they
are matched and begin working is their true productivity revealed. They subsequently
decide whether to remain matched or to split up. There has been other empirical work
on learning and labor market transition although most of the learning literature has
focused on workers’ job-specific (Jovanovic (1979), Gorry et al. (2019)) or occupation-
specific abilities (Kambourov and Manovskii (2009), Antonovics and Golan (2012),
Papageorgiou (2014)). For example, the process of learning about skills within blue
collar versus white collar jobs, or professional occupations versus non-professional
occupations, has been widely studied. These studies found that nearly 20% of
workers change their occupation every year, and that subsequent wage gains are
as large as a third of early-career wage growth. (Kambourov and Manovskii (2009),
Topel and Ward (1992)).
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A growing body of literature, since Autor et al. (2003), has considered task-specific
approaches (Yamaguchi (2012), Sanders (2014), Autor and Dorn (2013)) instead of
job or occupation-specific abilities using task information in DOT and its successor,
the Occupational Information Network (O*NET). In this literature, skills are assumed
to be task specific and to reflect the daily responsibilities of workers. For example,
Yamaguchi (2012) and Sanders (2014) consider skills in two continuous dimensions,
cognitive and motor. Compared to the job-specific or occupation-specific skills, the
task-specific approach has many attractive characteristics for studying occupational
mobility, because it allows comparisons among different occupations in terms of skill
levels that are required to perform a job. In addition, it is easier to handle a large
number of occupations when they are defined in task-specific skills.
Yamaguchi (2012) departs from Roy (1951), where workers choose occupations
in which they have a comparative advantage. While many other Roy-type models
(Heckman and Sedlacek (1985), Keane and Wolpin (1997), Lee and Wolpin (2006))
provide insights about issues in heterogeneous human capital in different occupational
categories, Yamaguchi proposes a new interpretation for why skills in different occu-
pations are rewarded differently and how they are transferable across occupations by
assuming the returns to skills vary with task complexity. He assumes certainty about
skills and and examines occupational mobility while workers accumulate skills at work
(learning-by-doing). This paper builds upon Yamaguchi’s extension of Roy model,
and I introduce skill uncertainty and risk aversion to analyze the role of wealth in
career choice and the resulting income inequality.
6
CHAPTER 1. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF ABILITY LEARNING AND
CAREER CHOICE
This paper also builds on a long literature that investigates the connection between
wealth and risk-taking behavior represented by (Pratt (1978), Kimball (1989)). These
two papers provide the theory of risk taking behavior. Pratt (1978) proposes the
Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion and derives necessary and sufficient
conditions on utility functions for a decreasing risk premium with respect to wealth.
Based on this theory, there have been a large number of empirical papers that
examine relations between observed risk taking behaviors and wealth levels: for
example, savings decisions and wealth under income uncertainty or allocations of
savings to risky assets versus safe assets (Gourinchas and Parker (2002), Cagetti
(2003))
There have been some studies that analyze occupational decisions as risky choices
(King (1974), Saks and Shore (2005)). Most works in this vein focus on risk averse
individuals’ occupation choices, given some distributional characteristics pertaining
to occupation, such as the mean or variance of wages within occupations and test
whether workers with low wealth are likely to choose occupations that have low
wage variances. Therefore they conclude that workers are likely to choose a certain
occupation to another depending on their asset holdings. My paper is distinct from
these works, in that it treats risk in career choice as deriving from workers’ lack of
knowledge of their own abilities, rather than from occupation-specific characteristics,
and in that the uncertainty is gradually resolved from work experience.
To my best knowledge, this is the first paper to propose a learning channel between
wealth and income inequality. I provide a dynamic model and empirical evidence to
7
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test this proposed channel and its implications for income inequality.
1.3 Data
Research on occupational mobility often struggles with the question of how best
to group occupations into categories. Coarse definitions do not entirely capture the
differences between and within occupations. There may exist a huge discrepancy
among the occupations which are grouped in the same categories, and there may be
some occupations in different categories but share similar characteristics in terms
of the job tasks. However, finer distinctions (thus resulting in more categories)
are hard to operationalize, because the number of parameters or states increase
with the number of occupations. Therefore, many papers for occupation-specific
human capital consider only a limited number of occupations up to Census one-digit
occupations which categorize occupations into 12 subcategories (Johnson and Keane
(2013), Papageorgiou (2014)).
In addition to these difficulties, it is also hard to evaluate on a practical level how
similar or different two distinctly coded occupations are. Therefore, skill transfer
across occupations is often ignored when assessing returns to occupational tenure.
With traditional occupational groupings as distinct and flat categories, researchers
only observe whether a worker has entered or exited a given category. Therefore,
it is hard to analyze career movements apart from simply calculating transition
8
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probabilities.
To overcome this problem, I borrow Yamaguchi (2012)’s framework, which over-
comes these challenges by defining occupation in a novel way. Using task information
from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT), Yamaguchi defines an occupation
as a bundle of tasks along two different dimensions, cognitive and motor complexity,
while also accounting for each dimension’s intensity. Therefore, occupations are
represented as a simple 1 by 2 vector, where each number gives information about
how difficult this job is to do in terms of the each skill dimension. For example, the
average task complexity of professional occupations is (0.85, 0.45), while the average
craftsman occupation is (0.52, 0.82). Occupations in professional categories on average
require higher cognitive task compared to the average craftsman occupations, but
motor task intensity is much larger for craftsman than professional occupations in
average.
The advantage of using Yamaguchi’s categorization is that it allows for richer
evaluations of occupational mobility; not only can the frequency of movement be
analyzed, but also the directionality of movement. For example, does the worker
move up or down the scale of task complexity (along the cognitive and/or motor
dimension), or does the worker perhaps move laterally - into a new job that requires
different kinds of skills? Such a categorization method also allows me to observe how
radical an occupational transition is, as we can examine the distance between the
new and old task requirements.
The following subsections include explanations for the data constructed in Yamaguchi
9
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(2012) and the additional variable, initial wealth in detail.
1.3.1 Dictionary of Occupational Titles
The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) contains detailed task infor-
mation on 12,099 occupations. Each occupation is evaluated with respect to 62
characteristics, such as aptitudes, temperaments, necessary training time, physical
demand, and working conditions. Yamaguchi (2012), like many other authors who
use the DOT, categorizes these job characteristics into cognitive and motor tasks
(Bacolod and Blum (2010), Ingram and Neumann (2006)). Autor et al. (2003) and
Autor and Dorn (2013) consider three skill dimensions including abstract, manual,
and routine task to analyze the allocation of task between labor and capital due to
the technological changes in the labor market.
The DOT variables that Yamaguchi uses to measure cognitive complexity consist
of two worker function variables (data and people), three general educational devel-
opment variables (reasoning, mathematical, and language), three aptitude variables
(intelligence, verbal, and numerical), and three adaptability variables (influencing
people, accepting responsibility for direction, and dealing with people). The motor
complexity measure, meanwhile, comes from 20 physical demand variables, including
motor coordination, finger dexterity, manual dexterity, eye-hand-foot coordination,
spatial perception, form perception, color discrimination, setting limits, and tolerance
or standards. Following Autor et al. (2003), the two measures, cognitive and motor
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complexity, are converted into percentile scores among the all occupations, taking a
value between 0 and 1.
1.3.2 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979
The National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979 (NLSY79) is particularly
suitable for this study because it is a long panel data set which contains detailed
individual career information and focuses on the young, when most labor market
transactions actually occur (Neal (1999)). The survey includes individuals who are
between 14 and 21 years old as of January 1, 1979. Occupations in the NLSY79 are
coded using a three-digit Census frame, which consists of 503 distinctive categories.
Yamaguchi restricts his samples to male workers who make long-term transitions in
the labor market during 1979-2000. A long-term transition means working 30 hours
per week or more for three consecutive years during the periods. His final data set
includes 2,417 workers’ career history, 32,774 person-year observations of occupational
choices and 31,157 person-year observations of wages. The DOT occupations are
aggregated into the three-digit classifications in order to merge with the NLSY79.
Worker characteristics such as race, AFQT (Armed Forces Qualification Test) score,
and years of education are also obtained from the NLSY79. Excluding non-workers
from the sample may bias the estimators in the event some people lose a job because
of a bad match and their wage is missing.
In addition to occupation, wage, workers’ pre-labor market characteristics variables
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constructed in Yamaguchi (2012), I obtained initial asset information from the
NLSY79. I focus on money assets such as the savings account of the respondent and
his/her spouse. Household assets are recorded after 1985 and once every two years in
NLSY79. Therefore, for workers who entered in the labor market between 1979 to
1984, I have information about their wealth level only after they have worked and
accumulated assets for some years. For this reason, I construct predicted initial wealth
using the information from workers who have records of initial assets at their labor
market entry, workers’ initial characteristics such as years of educational attainment,
AFQT scores, demographics, and their first period labor earnings.
Table 1.1 reports the mean and standard deviation of all variables and Figure
1.1 shows the histogram of the predicted initial wealth data used in this paper. The
mean of the AFQT score is 49.079 and the standard deviation is 30.1438. The average
years of educational attainment is slightly over 13 years (13.2375) and its standard
deviation is 2.5353. The percentage of Hispanics in the sample is about 11%, and
about 82% of the sample are whites. Average age at the labor market entry is 21.1386
with a standard deviation of 2.9532. Log Initial asset levels are in 2005 real dollars.
The mean is 5.57 and the standard deviation is 2.6359. As mentioned (asset levels are
only recorded after 1985, once in two years), only a smaller subset of the full sample
(503 out of 2417) have data on initial assets. The summary of wage and occupations
show hourly wage rates in 2005 real dollars, and cognitive and motor task choice
observed yearly from 1979 to 2000. The mean of the hourly wage rate is 17.6904 with
a standard deviation of 10.4820.
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Table 1.2 shows more detailed summaries for the panel data. We can see that
on average, the hourly wage rate increases continuously from 11.8307 in year 1 to
23.4238 in year 22. The variance of the wage distribution increases in years as well,
from 5.7708 in year 1 to 12.3660 in year 22. This is a common finding, earnings
profiles spread out over time. The number of observations decreases in year because
‘year’ indicates the years after labor market entry. A smaller number of data points
are observed for longer periods of time.
Table 1.1 also shows the summary of pooled data on occupational choices. The
mean of cognitive task choice for all years is 0.5018 and its standard deviation is
0.2645, and the mean and standard deviation for motor tasks is 0.5291 and 0.2487
respectively. Table 1.2 describes how they change over the life cycle. For cognitive
choices, we observe increasing trends from 0.4124 to 0.5436, and slightly decreasing
trends in motor tasks from 0.5313 to 0.5147 for over 22 years. It is rising for the first
6 years, and starts to decline after. The on-the-job skill accumulation (learning-by-
doing) process could be very different for different sets of skills, suggesting that a
single accumulation rule for skills in multi-dimension will not be able to successfully
illustrate skill changes over the life-cycle. Another possible explanation is that motor
skills are likely to depreciate as workers get older, and this skill depreciation effect
may dominate skill accumulation in the later periods of the life-cycle. The standard
deviations stay roughly the same for both tasks.
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1.4 Reduced Form Empirical Evidence on Learning
One important question to address prior to investigating further the impacts that
learning about one’s true skill level has for a worker is whether learning indeed exists
in the labor market. Although imperfect information about ability and learning has
been widely discussed in the literature, there has not, in fact, been much empirical
evidence to demonstrate its importance. One finding in the literature that suggests
learning, is the fact that job mobility decreases with age and tenure (Neal (1999)).
And in a recent paper, Arcidiacono et al. (2016) address the fact that those who
receive wages in excess of their worker characteristics are more likely to stay in the
same occupation. The authors suggest this correlation as evidence for learning.
However, both features can be fully explained through a search model that does
not account for learning. Workers keep searching until they find a satisfactory match;
hence, probabilistically, job mobility decreases with both age and current wage.
Taking advantage of the continuous task complexity space in Yamaguchi (2012),
I first show reduced-form evidence of learning. Using Yamaguchi’s data set, I regress
the log hourly wage on individual characteristics such as race, education, AFQT scores
before labor market entry, occupation-specific experience, and most importantly, the
cognitive and motor task requirements of their current job, as well as an interaction
term between the two skill requirements. The “surprise” is computed as the wage
residual. Even if a positive or negative surprise in wage is informative regarding
productivity, it is an overall wage surprise. Workers cannot observe how much of
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the surprise is from their cognitive skills or from motor skills. However, the relative
intensity between cognitive and motor tasks at the current job may be informative
for workers to infer the source of this new information; workers who use cognitive
(motor) skills more at the current job will learn more about their cognitive (motor)
skills than their motor (cognitive) skills.
I use a rough measure of the relative intensity in this section; occupations are
either cognitive- or motor-task intensive. If the cognitive task requirement is higher
than the motor task requirement in the current occupation, that occupation is called
cognitive-task intensive (or “cognitive-intensive”); otherwise, motor-task intensive (or
“motor-intensive”). Workers who have cognitive-intensive occupations are expected
to learn more about their level of cognitive skill, and workers with motor-intensive
occupations will learn more about their level of motor skill. Those who have a
cognitive-intensive occupation and receive a positive signal, therefore, are expected to
seek occupational moves that require greater cognitive intensity; those who receive a
negative signal, by contrast, are expected to move “down” to a less cognitive-intensive
job. Similarly, people with motor-intensive occupations are expected to seek future
jobs with more motor tasks, once they find (by virtue of a positive signal) that they
are capable in that type of skill; however, they would not be expected to move in the
same direction with respect to cognitive-intensive work, since cognitive and motor
skills reflect different dimensions.
I estimated log hourly wage equations with and without individual fixed effects.
The estimated wage equation without fixed effects is:
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lnwit = α +X1itβ1 +X2itβ2 + uit (1.1)
from which the signal, or surprise, is calculated as
signalit = ûit
= lnwit − α +X1itβ̂1 +X2itβ̂2
(1.2)
And a panel data regression with fixed effects and the signal are:
lnwit = αi +X1itβ1 + uit (1.3)
signalit = ûit
= lnwit − αi +X1itβ̂1
(1.4)
where X1 includes cognitive task xc, motor task xm, the interaction term of the two
xcxm, occupational tenure, occupational tenure squared, years of the experience in
the labor market and its squared, and X2 includes AFQT score, years of education,
race dummy.
The first column of Table 1.3 shows OLS estimates and the second column shows
fixed effect estimates. When the observed occupation is the same as in the previous
period and wage data is missing, the wage is assumed to be the same as the previous
period. Both regressions show that there is a sizable difference in returns for cognitive
and for motor tasks. The coefficients on the interaction term between the two are
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negative, and occupational tenure has positive effects on the log wage. The OLS
regression controls for the AFQT score, years of education, and race dummy variables,
and age.
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 show the regression results for cognitive and motor tasks, xc
and xm ∈ (0, 1) respectively, chosen in t+ 1 on the tasks in period t using the wage
residual predicted in the OLS regression and the fixed-effects panel data regressions,
respectively. Therefore, Tables 1.4 and 1.5 show the direction of occupational move-
ment in each of the two tasks. Dummy variable Dc,t = 1 indicates cognitive-intensive
occupations where xc,t > xm,t.
The coefficients on signalt × Dc,t in Tables 1.4 and 1.5 suggest that a worker who
has received unexpectedly high monetary rewards will move up to jobs that require
more of the abilities that the worker is currently using compared to the workers in
the motor-intensive jobs. On the other hand, those who have received disappointingly
low wages adjust themselves into new occupations that require different kinds of skills.
Workers in cognitive-intensive sectors tend to move up into more intensive cognitive
tasks as their wage residuals increase, while negative shocks may make them choose
higher motor tasks instead.
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1.5 Model
This section develops a dynamic career choice model that accounts for learning
and wealth inequality. Occupations are still defined over the two-dimensional contin-
uous tasks space. Workers observe their current wage as a productivity signal and
update their beliefs about their abilities accordingly. Workers are risk-averse and
heterogeneous with respect to initial wealth and skill endowments. All information
regarding workers’ work history is assumed to be public; therefore employers are
assumed to have symmetric information. Finally, the labor market is assumed to be
competitive.
Both informational friction and risk aversion are crucial for wealth inequality to
have a role in the career choice. In the perfect-information case, for example, a worker
knows in which occupation he can be most productive and hence knows which career
path results in the highest payoffs. Regardless of his risk preference, then, any worker
in a perfect-information scenario would choose the occupation that gives the highest
future wage streams, to maximize his lifetime budget. Risk preference, in this case,
could affect a decision-maker’s consumption and savings behavior but not his career
choice; therefore wealth would not play a role in occupational choice.
Meanwhile, a worker who is risk-neutral but does not know her ability perfectly
will choose an occupation that has the highest expected wage streams regardless how
much risk is involved in that choice. A wage-maximizing career path maximizes the
risk-neutral worker’s lifetime utility as well, and her occupational choice depends only
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on her own (imperfect) belief in her ability, but not on the wealth in her hands.
If a worker is both risk-averse and has imperfect information about his own ability,
however, that worker might not want to choose the wage-maximizing occupation
after all, if the wage-maximizing choice were associated with high risk. Workers
may be discouraged from actively engaging in learning. Hence, underinvestment
in career choice occurs, and the gap between risk-optimal and wage-maximizing
occupations could be wider for workers with low wealth under plausible assumptions
such as constant relative risk aversion or credit constraints. In effect, workers with
greater wealth are more likely to find occupations with better fit, and therefore wealth
inequality can increase further still. Additionally, as time passes by, workers who
experiment more, learn more about their ability, and so wage inequality may increase
even further.
Lifetime income risk, in this model, derives from skill uncertainty; workers make
decisions about consumption, savings, and their next-period occupations, all in
response to the partial realization of uncertainty, and they adjust their career paths
accordingly in order to maximize lifetime utility.
My model consists of the following elements: 1) a wage function which is deter-
mined by the choice of tasks, workers’ true skills, and a random transitory shock, and
2) a skill accumulation equation which depends on workers’ previous skill level, task
choices, and a permanent productivity shock on each skill dimension, and 3) a formal
description of learning and belief updating process by Bayes Rule. The following
subsections describe this model in detail.
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1.5.1 Wage function
Both workers and employers have imperfect and symmetric information about
workers’ skills, and the labor market is assumed to be competitive. Therefore, workers
are paid by their marginal value product. The marginal value product of a worker with
skill st = (sct, smt) ∈ R2 in an occupation with task complexity xt = (xct, xmt) ∈ (0, 1)2
is
wt = π(xt) + q(xt, st) + εt, (1.5)
where εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε ) is an independent and identically distributed transitory pro-
ductivity shock. The output price from task xt is defined as π(xt), and q(xt, st) is
a worker’s marginal productivity which depends on the task xt and skill st levels. I
assume that the marginal productivity of a worker who is endowed with skill st in
occupation xt takes the following form:
q(xt, st) = (B2(αst − xt))′xt, (1.6)
where α is a scalar, and B2 is 2-dimensional diagonal matrix. Labor productivity is
the inner product of excessive skill and task requirement. Note that components in
the term (αst − xt) can be negative. If a low skilled worker chooses an occupation
that requires much higher task, the low labor productivity will result in low wages.
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The output price π(xt) is assumed to be linear in the task requirements.
π(xt) = B0 +B
′
1xt, (1.7)
where B1 is a two dimensional vector. Finally, period t wage wt can be written as
wt = B0 +B
′





where B3 = αB2. Wage coefficients B0, B1, B2 and B3, and the distribution of the
transitory shocks εt are known to workers, but they do not observe their true skills
st and realization of the shock εt. Therefore, when wt is unexpectedly high (or low),
workers cannot perfectly pin down whether that is because their true skill st is high
(low) or they were just lucky (unlucky).
By construction, the variance in the wage distribution within an occupation is
larger as the job task intensity xt is higher. For example, for an imaginary occupation
xct = xmt = 0, wt is simply B0 + B′1xt − x′tB2xt for everyone, regardless of workers’
skill st. However, as the task intensity xt rises, the wage depends more and more
heavily on the workers’ true skill levels st and the variance in the wage distribution
becomes larger.
If B1, B2 and B3 are positive, for any worker with st > 0, the expected value of
the unknown part of the wage gt increases with respect to the occupational choice xt.
However, the marginal change in the known part of the wage, B1 −B2xt decreases
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with respect to xt, hence B2, cost of mismatch (overshooting), provides an incentive
not to choose high xt for workers who believe their true skills st are low.
1.5.2 Skill accumulation
Skills accumulate based on the workers’ skills in the previous period and the choice
of occupations. The following equation shows the process of skill accumulation:





s0 = H0 +H1d+ η0
(1.9)
Where ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η) is a iid shock on the skills which reflect a permanent shock
in the productivity. Workers know the values of A1, A2, and the distribution of the
permanent skill shocks, ηt. Initial skills s0 depend on the worker’s characteristics d
before the labor market entry and the unknown iid skill shock η0 ∼ N(0, σ2η0). A0 ,
A1, H0, st, ηt, and ση are 2 dimensional vectors, and A2 is 2× 2 diagonal matrix.
1.5.3 Learning
Workers do not exactly know their skill levels. Instead, workers have beliefs about
their skills and update the belief from the wage realization each period. Wage depends
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on the labor productivity q(xt, st), so it is informative about skills. Workers observe a
signal gt, the sum of the last two terms in the wage equation gt := (B3xt)′st + εt, but
they do not know the decomposition. Three unobservable and independent factors
contribute to the signal gt; Cognitive skills, motor skills and the iid productivity
shock εt.
gt = B3cxctsct +B3mxmtsmt + εt, (1.10)
where a worker’s prior belief before signal gt on each term is
B3cxctsct ∼ N(B3cxctŝc,t−1, (B3cxct)2σ2c,t−1),
B3mxmtsmt ∼ N(B3mxmtŝm,t−1, (B3mxmt)2σ2m,t−1),
εt ∼ N(0, σ2ε )
(1.11)
A worker’s prior beliefs on st are the expected skills given all information available up
to period t−1, ŝt−1 = E(st−1|gt−1, xt−1) and the variance for each skill is σ2c,t−1, σ2m,t−1.
Workers update their beliefs on the cognitive and motor skills by Bayes rule.
By construction, the signal gt is weighted by the task complexity xt. Those who
exert one skill more intensively than another gain more information on the skill that is
used more intensively. For example, in the extreme case of xt = [1, 0], the occupation
requires cognitive skill only, hence the worker will gain information on her cognitive
skill but not motor skill by the signal gt. For notational simplicity, let τct, τmt, τε be
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2σ2m,t−1, and σ2ε respectively.
E(B3cxctsct|gt) = B3cxctŝc,t−1 +
τct(gt −B3cxctŝc,t−1 −B3mxmtŝm,t−1)
τct + τmt + τε
=
τct(gt −B3mxmtŝm,t−1) + (τmt + τε)B3cxctŝc,t−1
τct + τmt + τε
(1.12)
Hence, the posterior belief on cognitive skill given the noisy signal gt is
E(sct|gt) =
(τmt + τε)ŝc,t−1 + τct
(gt−B3mxmtŝm,t−1)
B3cxct
τct + τmt + τε
(1.13)
Similarly, the updated belief on motor skill is given by:
E(smt|gt) =
(τct + τε)ŝm,t−1 + τmt
(gt−B3cxctŝc,t−1)
B3mxmt
τct + τmt + τε
(1.14)
The updated variance of cognitive skill is
var(B3cxctsct) = τct −
τ 2ct
τct + τmt + τε
=
τctτmt + τctτε
τct + τmt + τε
(1.15)





τct + τmt + τε
=
σ2c,t−1(τmt + τε)
τct + τmt + τε
(1.16)
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Similarly, the updated variance of motor skill is





τct + τmt + τε
=
σ2m,t−1(τct + τε)
τct + τmt + τε
(1.17)
1.5.4 Bellman Equation
Combining all the components listed in this section, Bellman equation for a
decision maker is formulated as:
Vt(mt, ŝt, σ
2
t ) = max
ct,xt+1
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s.t. at = zt − ct ≥ 0
zt+1 = at + wt+1
wt+1 = B0 +B
′
1xt+1 − x′t+1B2xt+1 + gt+1
ŝt+1 = Et(st|gt) + A1xt+1 + x′t+1A2xt+1
σ2j,t+1 =
σ2jt(τ−j,t+1 + τε)
τj,t+1 + τ−j,t+1 + τε
+ σ2ηj, j = {c,m}
xt ∈ (0, 1)2
(1.19)
where gt+1 ∼ N(x′t+1B3ŝt, (x′t+1B3σt)2 + (σε)2), at is the end of the period t asset,
amount of assets left after wage realization and the consumption decision in period t.
And zt is wealth, or cash-on-hand, available to use for consumption in the beginning
of the period t. Individual workers choose current period consumption, and next
period occupation to maximize expected lifetime utility.
Using the backward induction, I numerically solve for the three choice variables
which simultaneously satisfy the three first order conditions with respect to the
each choice variable. In the final period T , the only choice that workers have is
consumption. Workers exhausts their total wealth in the last period.
VT (mT , ŝT , σ
2
T ) = max
CT
u(CT )
s.t. CT = aT + wT
(1.20)
One period before, the optimal choices for workers satisfy the following three first
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order conditions for CT−1, xc,T , xm,T respectively.
u′(CT−1) =Et(V
′









(B1c − 2B2cxcT +B3cscT +B3cxcT
∂scT
∂xcT




(B1m − 2B2mxmT +B3msmT +B3mxmT
∂smT
∂xmT
)) = 0 (1.23)




terms because the beliefs of
each skill do not have any effects in the final period T , since the only choice variable
is consumption at T .

















) = 0 (1.24)
To show ∂Vt+1
∂ŝt+1
= 0, take a partial derivative of each side with respect to ŝt.
27






































































Using the same process, the first order condition for motor task xm,t+1 is again
reduced to:
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Intuitively, beliefs affect the value function only through choices. Given a fixed
occupational choice, having a higher or lower belief about ability does not change
incomes, or the current and future utility values. Finally, the first order condition
with respect to ct is:
u′(Ct) = Et(u
′(Ct+1)) (1.29)
Assuming A1c, A1m, A2c, A2m = 0 for simplicity, equations (22), (23), (27), and (28)




















As long as x∗ct+1, x∗mt+1 ∈ (0, 1), the optimal occupational task xj is decreasing in
B2j which the cost of mismatch between skill and task in the wage equation (1.8) ,
and increasing in B1j and B3j, which are the reward for the unit of tasks and the
coefficient on the interaction term between the skill and the chosen task.
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In the perfect information about the skills case, where the only remaining uncer-
tainty is in the idiosyncratic wage shock (equation (1.5)), the optimal occupational


























In this case, the optimal occupation choices depend only on the workers true skill
and the coefficients in the wage function.
If skills are unknown but workers are risk neutral, hence the utility function and


























Again, in this case, the optimal occupations are determined only by the coefficients
in the wage function and the mean of the skill beliefs.
However, if there are uncertainties and risk aversion, the first term inside the
expectation in equation (1.30), ∂Vt+1
∂zt+1
, cannot be dropped, and the solution will depend
on the curvature of the utility function with respect to consumption.
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Workers face wage risks from two sources, from unknown skills sc and sm, and
a transitory wage shock ε. Given any current belief (ŝt, σ2t ), the distribution of the
unknown part of the future wage wt+1 is:
gt+1 ∼ N(x′t+1B3ŝt, (x′t+1B3σt)2 + (σε)2) (1.33)
Workers expect higher wages when ŝ is higher, and larger variances when their belief
is noisier (σ2t ). Workers can control the size of the wage risk that comes from unknown
skills through occupational choice. For example, in an extreme case, if a worker is
particularly averse to wage fluctuations, she can minimize her wage risk (variance)
to the minimum level σ2ε by choosing xc,t+1 = xm,t+1 = 0. In doing so, however, this
worker does not learn anything about her skills, and her expected skills in period
t+ 1 will remain the same as in the current period.
As long as B3 and ŝt are positive, an increase in xt+1 will raise both the mean and
the variance of the unknown part of the wage gt+1, and the marginal effect on the
known part of the wage is B1 − 2B2xt+1. If absolute risk aversion is decreasing, then
the risk premium declines with respect to wealth, and hence the optimal occupational
choice xt+1 will be higher when workers are rich, given the same beliefs. Therefore,
workers choose occupations xt+1 not only by their wage coefficients and beliefs, but
also by taking their risk preferences and wealth levels into account.
There is not a closed-form solution in this case, and it will be numerically solved
by the algorithm introduced in the following subsection.
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1.5.5 Algorithm to Solve the Model
Calculating the optimal amount of risk to take jointly with savings decisions in
a multi-dimensional space is a difficult problem, which cannot be solved without
complicated numerical computations. To speed up the calculation, I transform the
three dimensions of continuous controls, consumption and two tasks, into a sequence
of two optimization problems. For any given levels of assets and belief, I first find the
optimal task choices that satisfy the first-order conditions in equations (27) and (28)
simultaneously. With the optimal occupation policy function in hand, I calculate the
expected future income for the five-dimensional grid of the state space, and this allows
me to solve for the simple consumption choice, given current assets and expected
income, the latter of which is derived using the occupation policy function.
To find the optimal tasks that simultaneously satisfy the two first-order conditions,
I use Broyden’s method (Broyden (1965)), which is an extension of the secant method
of root finding to higher dimensions. The key idea behind Broyden’s method is to
calculate the whole Jacobians only once and to update using the secant information
at other iterations. For root finding problems with simple Jacobians such as linear
optimizations, Newton’s method is more suitable for the point of view of the time
effectiveness, because it converges in fewer iterations than Broyden’s method. However,
Newton’s method requires repeated evaluation of the system of Jacobians for each
iteration, Broyden’s method can reach the optimum faster in complicated, non-linear
optimization problems of this kind. I solve for the numerical optimums xct and xmt
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mt) (equation(30)). I obtain the policy functions for the two tasks
choices by spline interpolation.
For the second step, I use the Endogenous Grid Method proposed by Carroll
(2006). In this step, the objective is to find the value Ct, which has the same marginal
valuation for each of the ends of the period asset value at using the first-order condition.
And obtain zt simply as the sum of at and Ct. As opposed to the usual solution
methods that define ex-ante grids for zt and then perform root-finding routines
to find corresponding optimal Ct, the Endogenous Grid Method does not require
a root-finding process; hence, it speeds up the numerical computation greatly. I
numerically calculate the marginal expected value (EV ′t ) given the expected income
wt at the optimal occupation for each set of states (zt, ŝct, σ2ct, ŝmt, σ2mt) to find the
optimal consumption Ct.
Finally, I evaluate the outside the grid chosen for solution by spline interpolation.
1.6 Estimation Results
I jointly estimate all the structural parameters; risk aversion, wage, and skill
accumulation coefficients, initial wealth and initial skills, using Simulated Method of
Moments. I simulate the career and savings choices of 12,085 workers (5 replications
of 2,417 profiles observed in the NLSY79) using the observed individual backgrounds
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and work histories for 20 years after the labor market entry.
For simulation, I made the following final period assumptions. First, workers do
not change occupations after the first 20 years in the labor market. Second, workers
work for 20 more years in the same occupation afterwards. Finally, it is assumed that
workers expect to live for 20 more years after retirement so that workers do not use
up all their savings at that time of the retirement.
I construct 150 moments, including the mean of wages and task choices of each
1-year period after labor market entry for 20 years of the data. I use conditional
moments for wages and task choices on the two different levels of educations: low if
the final education is high school graduate or less, and high if some college or above.
The estimates θ̂ are defined by





(Mdk −M sk(θ))2/Var(Mdk )
)}
(1.34)
where (Mdk represents kth data moment and M sk(θ) is kth simulated moment at the
parameter value θ. I compute asymptotic standard errors following Gourieroux et al.
(1993).
1.6.1 Parameter Estimates
One of the key elements in this model is the stochastic process of wages, because
that is a main source of uncertainty. Workers observe the productivity signal gt =
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B3cxctsct + B3mxmtsmt + εt and update their beliefs to make a future occupational
choice. The mean-zero idiosyncratic shock εt with standard deviation σε = 0.5045,
reported in Row 5 in Table 1.6, guarantees that the signal is noisy. Therefore, workers
cannot immediately pin down their skills after one year of work experience.
Table 1.6 shows that the reward for an additional unit of cognitive task, B1c =
14.5424, is much higher than for motor task, B1m = 5.3875, a finding consistent
with the reduced-form results OLS and panel data fixed effect wage regressions in
Table tab1:wagereg. Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction terms between task
and workers’ true skill is larger for cognitive tasks than for motor tasks, where
B3c = 27.3512 and B3m = 20.6370. However, more interestingly, the cost for
overshooting – that is, the cost of choosing a higher task complexity when one’s true
ability is low – is also much higher for cognitive tasks (B2c = 28.5607) than for motor
tasks (B2m = 19.2269). Therefore, even though the compensation for cognitive tasks
is higher than for motor tasks, having an occupation that requires high cognitive
intensity may not be an attractive choice for risk-averse workers if the variance, which
is uncertainty, in their cognitive skill belief is large.
Table 1.6 also reports the CRRA risk aversion coefficient, ρ = 3.8666, which is
strictly greater than 0 and implies that workers are risk averse. Previous literature
typically finds that the risk aversion coefficient for CRRA utility function is in the
range of 1 to 5 (MaCurdy et al. (1990), Friedberg (2000)). The estimated risk aversion
coefficient implies that when workers have uncertainty about their own skills, they
will under-invest; they will choose lower-intensity tasks in situations with uncertainty,
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compared with situations in which their skills are perfectly known. Moreover, this
inefficiency (due to uncertainty) will decrease with workers’ wealth level.
Table 1.7 shows the estimates for the initial skills and the skill accumulation
parameters. Cognitive skills accumulate almost linearly along the choice of cognitive
task, where A1c = 0.0479 and A2c = 0.0023. The coefficient on the quadratic term of
cognitive task, A2c, is close to zero and not statistically significant. However, motor
skill accumulation is concave in the motor task choice, where A1m = 0.0663 and
A2m = −0.0742. Therefore, motor skill accumulates more as the choice of the motor
task is larger. However, the marginal benefit of motor skill accumulation for choosing
higher motor tasks diminishes as the motor task itself increases.
Idiosyncratic skill accumulation shocks, reported in the 3rd row in Table 1.7,
accounts for the permanent shock in workers’ productivity. The estimation results
show that the standard deviation of the distribution of cognitive skill accumulation
shock is 1.1081, while the standard deviation for the distribution of the motor skill
accumulation shock is smaller, 0.0580.
I use two pre-labor market entry variables to determine initial skills: AFQT
score and years of education. Both variables have a positive coefficient on the initial
cognitive skill, where H1c = 0.0027 and H2c = 0.1028. On the other hand, both
variables have a negative coefficient on the initial motor skill, H1m = −0.0012 and
H2m = −0.0519, while the coefficient of AFQT on the motor skill is not statistically
significant.
Row 8 of Table 1.7 reports the standard deviation of initial belief distribution for
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each of the skill dimensions. The standard deviation of the initial belief distribution
for cognitive skill is 0.3212, while for motor skill it is 0.3866. Therefore, on average,
workers start with a higher degree of uncertainty about their motor skills than their
cognitive skills at the time of labor market entry. However, because of the higher
uncertainty in cognitive skill accumulation (compared to motor skill accumulation),
the uncertainty about motor skills resolves faster than it does for cognitive skills over
the life cycle.
1.6.2 Model Fit and Implications
The model’s prediction fits the observed data well overall. Figure 1.2 shows the
life-cycle profiles of occupations for each education group, where “high education”
means that the highest level of educational attainment was some college education or
higher, and “low education” means that the highest level attained was high school
graduate or lower.
Cognitive task choices in Figure 1.2 (a) show an increasing pattern over time for
both education groups, with the large gap between the two. Rather surprisingly, the
average cognitive task choice for the low-education group continuously rises over the
life cycle, while cognitive task choices for the high-education group increase rather
sharply during the early periods of their careers and then stay constant after about
10 years post-labor market entry. As a result, the gap between the cognitive task
choices of the two groups slightly decreases over the life cycle, both within the data
37
CHAPTER 1. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF ABILITY LEARNING AND
CAREER CHOICE
and in the model simulation.
Figure 1.2 (b), then, shows the life-cycle profiles of the average motor task for each
education group. The low-education group always chooses higher motor tasks than
the high-education group does, on average. However, average motor task choice does
not show generally increasing patterns for both groups; rather, the groups’ motor
task choices stay constant overall. To be even more precise, the low-education group’s
average motor task choice increases slightly in the early periods of their careers,
and decreases afterwards; for the higher-education group, their motor task choices
continue to diminish slightly over all the years. Still, the overall changes in motor
task choices are very small compared to the changes previously observed in cognitive
tasks.
The life-cycle profiles of the hourly wage rates are presented in Figure 1.3. On
average, both education groups receive higher wages as their experience in the labor
market increases, though it should be noted that both data and simulation results
show that the wage gap between the two education groups widens over life cycle. For
example, the high-education group, on average, received about $3 more per hour
compared to the low-education group in the first year of labor market entry. However,
by the 20th year, the difference in hourly wages between the two groups is around
$10. This is a common finding in the literature: wage gaps widen over time.
The findings in Figure 1.2 and Figure 1.3 suggest that the widening wage gap is
not due to highly-educated workers choosing more complex tasks over time, but rather
to the dynamic effect of on-the-job skill accumulation and learning. Highly-educated
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workers tend to choose higher cognitive tasks in the early periods of the life cycle,
and through the skill accumulation and learning channels, this choice returns even
higher cognitive skills for highly-educated workers.
While workers’ true skills or beliefs are not observed in the data, the simulation
results in Figure 1.4 show the progressions of the workers’ beliefs about their skills; the
means and the standard deviations of their beliefs. Figure 1.4 (a) reveals a widening
gap in the means of the cognitive skill beliefs held by the two education groups, which
drives the increasing wage gaps between the groups in turn. In the 20th year, the gap
between the means of cognitive skills are about 0.25 larger compared to the first year.
The 0.25 difference in the cognitive skills accounts for about $4.78 of wage differences
when xc = 0.7. By contrast, the means of motor skill belief in both groups stays
constant over the life cycle, while the low-education group shows small increments
and the high-education group shows the opposite. Panels (c) and (d) in Figure 1.4
depict the standard deviations of beliefs over time. For both cognitive and motor
skills the uncertainties drop for the first 8 years after entering the labor market and
stay roughly constant after.
Figure 1.5 presents the hourly wage profiles across the quartiles of the wage
distribution to show that the simulation results can replicate the dispersion of wages
in data. The model prediction fits the data well, while the main discrepancy lies in
the bottom 25% of the high-education group’s income distribution. This accounts
for the fact that simulated average wage profiles for high education in Figure 1.3
are slightly lower than the actual data show. As many previous studies on income
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inequality document, figure 1.4 shows that the variance of the income distribution
among the highly-educated workers is much larger than the variance in the income
distribution for the low-educated group.
1.6.3 Benefits of Learning
In this section, I analyze the relative importance of learning and skill accumulation
for lifetime earnings. To separate the two dynamic effects of career choice, I simulated
the model without any of the learning effects described in Section 5.3. Workers’ skills
can increase over time due to the on-the-job skill accumulation, and their beliefs
change accordingly taking skill accumulation effects into account. However, they do
not adjust their beliefs based on the productivity signals.
Figure 1.6 shows the average wage profiles of the workers with and without learning
effects. The solid line represents the baseline model with both learning and skill
accumulation, and the dashed line shows the simulation results without learning
effects. Workers in the two cases start with the same beliefs and true skills, therefore
the starting wages are the same. The overall increasing trends are also shown in both
scenarios. However, when workers update their beliefs based on the productivity
signals to allocate themselves into the occupations that fit better to their skills, they
can earn much more. The baseline model with the learning effects show over 20%
increases in the hourly wages 10 years after entering the labor market.
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1.6.4 Under-Investment in Career Choice and Distributional
Effects
In this section, using the estimated parameters, I analyze the distributional
effects of under-investment in occupational choices, which I define as a gap between
the utility-maximizing and income-maximizing occupational choices. The discrepancy
between the two choices occurs due to a combination of risk aversion and informational
friction (i.e., skill uncertainty). Even if workers expect to earn the highest income in a
certain occupation given their beliefs about their skills, that occupation still might not
be the optimal choice for them if the choice involves too much risk. Every risk-averse
worker with uncertainty will under-invest. However, the size of this inefficiency will be
larger for workers with low wealth if their risk preferences display decreasing absolute
risk aversion; if they find the same amount of monetary loss more hurtful when they
are poor compared to times they are rich.
Figure 1.7 graphically describes the inefficiencies in career choice. The dashed
line represents perfectly informed workers’ cognitive task choices for different asset
levels given a fixed level of true skill. Not surprisingly, these workers’ occupational
choices only depend on their true skills because wages are only determined by skills,
occupations, and idiosyncratic shocks. Therefore, workers who know their skill
levels choose their occupations regardless of their current assets. Workers who have
uncertainty about their skills, however, choose less cognitive tasks at all asset levels,
given the same beliefs and the same true skills. Furthermore, we can see that the
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discrepancy between the utility-maximizing and income-maximizing choices is larger
when current asset level is low. Figure 1.7 depicts only one dimension of the two
skills, however, we can expect the same patterns for the motor tasks as well.
This inefficiencies due to the informational friction causes income losses through
two channels: current wage drops and the loss in continuation values. The current
wage drop is a direct result of choosing less-complex (i.e., easier) occupations. Given
any fixed level of true skills, choosing any occupation other than the wage-maximizing
occupation returns lower expected wages in the current period.
The second channel, the losses in continuation values, includes two different
dynamic effects: skill accumulation and learning. The skill accumulation parameters in
Table 1.8 suggest that workers in a more demanding occupation today will accumulate
additional skills in both skill dimensions through on-the-job skill accumulation. This
effect is more drastic for cognitive tasks than motor tasks.
Finally, workers learn more about their true skills when they exert their skills more.
The productivity signal gt = B3cxctsct +B3mxmtsmt + εt in equation (1.13) is weighted
by the current occupation choice. For example, if a worker in the hypothetical
occupation requires no cognitive skills at all, xct = 0, then this worker knows that gt
only consists of the productivity generated by her motor skills and the idiosyncratic
shock, because she knows that she chose xct = 0. Hence, she will not learn any new
information about her cognitive skills, and her updated cognitive skill (given the signal
gt) will be exactly the same as her previous expectation, as in equation (1.16). In
addition, equations (1.17) and (1.18) demonstrate that the updated variances in skill
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beliefs become smaller as the chosen occupations themselves are larger. Therefore,
workers who choose more intensive occupations will have more precious information
about their true ability.
Hence, all of this to say, workers who choose a more intensive occupation today
ultimately have bigger chances of finding themselves in even higher positions in the
future, through these two dynamic effects.
To measure the inefficiency in career choices by wealth, I simulate occupational
choices for over 20 years of the life cycle for perfectly informed workers and compare
the resulting wage profiles with the baseline model from the estimated parameters by
the first-period wealth levels. The first column in Table 1.8 shows the wage profiles
for the low-wealth group. The direct effect of the wage drops in the first period is
rather sharp for this group. Without skill uncertainty, choosing wage-maximizing
occupations, on average, returns them $9.5202 per hour, while the optimal choices
under uncertainty yield only $7.1563.
After the first period of work experience and updating beliefs, the differences
between the two wage profiles are much smaller in each wealth group, compared to the
first period. However, the difference remains higher in the lower-wealth group. For
the higher-wealth group, by contrast, the differences between the two wage profiles
are smaller, both in the first period and throughout the life cycle. We can observe
only a small loss, $0.2690 per hour, in the last period of the last two columns.
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1.7 Policy Implication: Long-Run Effect of Baby Bonds
The Baby Bonds policy1 has been recently proposed to reduce the wealth gap
in the U.S. The main idea of the policy proposal is that a $1,000 savings account
would be opened at birth for every child in the U.S. and that children in low-income
households would get an additional deposit of up to $2,000 in their account each
year. At the age of 18, each person would receive the account, which would be worth,
at most, $46,215, including interest. This fund could be used for wealth-building
purposes only, such as pursuing a higher education, buying a house, or starting a
business.
Using the model, I simulate the long-term effects of the Baby Bonds policy at
two different levels of funds: annual supplement of $1,000 and annual supplement
of $2,000, which would be worth $23,948 and $46,215, respectively, 18 years after
the account openings. The proposal is intended to provide different amounts of
annual supports from $0 to $2000 based on the household income levels during the
account recipients’ childhoods. However, given the limitations in NLSY79 data, I
cannot observe parents’ income profiles from the moment that each person was born.
Therefore, I assume that the same amount of funds is given to everybody, and I add
the amount to workers’ original initial assets holdings before labor market entry.
This model does not take into account the effects of achieving higher education
or buying houses to increase one’s assets, but rather evaluates the other side of this
1American Opportunity Accounts Act, S.3766–115th Congress (2017-2018). Retrieved from
https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/3766/
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policy’s potential impact: namely, its potential to provide a safety net for young adults
to experiment and discover the career that best matches their skill level. Although this
model can potentially be extended to the choices related to wealth-building activities,
the current model does not include educational attainment, housing purchases, or
business startup as endogenous choice variables. However, considering that all these
choices can have positive long-term effects on a person’s lifetime earnings – either
through increases in initial skills, through additional wealth, or both – the simulation
results reported in Table 1.9 can serve as a lower bound of the policy effects in
alleviating income inequality.
Table 1.9 reports the effect of the additional (i.e., Baby Bonds) funds on income
inequality over the life cycle. Each row in Table 1.9 presents the average annual
income ratio between the bottom and the top of the first-period wealth distribution;
bottom 50% to top 50%, bottom 25% to top 25%, and bottom 10% to top 10%. The
results imply that the Baby Bonds policy would likely have a large, long-term effect
in reducing income inequality over the life cycle. $1000 of annual funds for 18 years,
which sum up (with interest) to $23,948 would increase the income ratio between
the bottom 50% and top 50% from 0.5131 to 0.5157, while they would increase the
income ratio between the bottom 25% and top 25% of initial wealth groups by 1.5%.
And $46,215 (the upper limit of the Baby Bonds proposal) would increase the bottom
50% to top 50% income ratio by 3% and increase the bottom 25% to top 25% income
ratio by 9.2%. The biggest impact is on the lowest decile of the wealth distribution.
Because the inefficiencies due to skill uncertainty and risk preference are largest for
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the people with the lowest wealth, equal amounts of additional funds from the Baby
Bonds have the biggest effects for them. $23,948 of funds will increase the income
ratio between the bottom 10% and top 10% of wealth groups, from 0.2466 to 0.2561,
and $46,215 will increase it to 0.3022.
1.8 Possible Extensions of the Model
In this section, I discuss some of the elements that were not included in the
current model but have the potential to draw interesting results once incorporated.
1.8.1 Job Preferences
The recent literature has documented that non-pecuniary job preferences are
one of the important factors for college major and occupational choices (Beffy et al.
(2012), Wiswall and Zafar (2016)). Indeed, omitting job preferences from this model
may have resulted in the biased estimators across different demographic groups. I
did try a specification with random assignments of task preferences in the current
model; however, the preference parameter estimates were not significant and close to
zero. It is possible that such a result was due to the limitations of the data used in
this paper; these data simply do not include good measures for individual-specific,
pre-determined job preferences, so instead, I relied only on the individual work history
(from the panel nature of the data) for the identification. Therefore, it is possible that
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the pre-determined differences in task preference may have appeared as differentials
in workers’ initial skills and beliefs. In other words, the model may have interpreted
that people believe they are good at the tasks they like – which may be only partially
true. Although the effect of job preferences is not the main focus of this article, the
current model can be easily extended to include them. Such an extension would
be especially interesting for studies concerning the comparison between broader
demographic groups such as male and female, immigrants and non-immigrants, or
domestic and foreign labor supply.
1.8.2 Moving Costs Across Occupations
Another interesting element worth discussing is the moving cost that occupational
mobility entails. In particular, the moving cost is relatable if there are utility costs to
moving; that is, if people prefer to stay in one occupation, or if there are monetary
costs attendant to obtaining new skills for new jobs, such as retraining or education
costs. In both cases, the role of wealth in occupational choice will be strengthened,
and we are likely to see stronger distributional effects and income inequalities as a
result.
1.8.3 Probability of Successful Match
This current model, furthermore, makes an important assumption about the
worker-job match. Namely, it assumes that once workers choose occupations (though
their earnings in the chosen occupations will depend on their true skills), they will
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certainly find a job within that occupation. In other words, the model assumes
that there is no mismatch that results in unemployment. Once we introduce the
probability of a match as a variable, along which the probability of the match declines
as a worker’s true skill level diverges further from (or sinks lower than) the skills
required by a given occupational choice, then the income risks that workers face when
they choose occupations will be larger, and again the role of wealth in occupational
choice will be even more important. Such an extension can be interesting for studies
that focus on unemployed job seekers; it may provide an interpretation for the role
of wealth in unemployed people’s occupational choices, and for the resulting match
outcomes in terms of match qualities, new-job earnings, or unemployment duration.
1.9 Conclusion
In this paper, I construct a structural model to analyze the role of wealth
in individual career choices and lifetime earnings. Wealth provides a buffer for
unexpected wage shocks that result from task-skill mismatch. Therefore, if workers’
risk preference displays decreasing absolute risk aversion, those who have greater
initial wealth are willing to endure more risk in order to find a better match, and they
are more likely to find an occupation that fits their skills. Hence, wealth inequality
could expand as a result of individual career choices even if every worker makes an
optimal choice given their asset levels and their belief of about their skills.
I used the model to quantify the inefficient resulted from the informational friction
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and risk preferences by the initial wealth levels and to simulated the effects of recently
proposed Baby Bonds policy on alleviating income inequality over the life-cycle.
To show the importance of ability learning, moreover, I use wage deviation as
a productivity signal, and I show reduced-form evidence that workers adjust their
occupations towards their comparative advantages as they learn about their skills.
Better knowledge about workers’ own ability will increase aggregate productivity
through optimal sorting into skill-appropriate occupations. For future work, this
structural model can be applied to evaluate policy impacts on the labor market,
with respect to how these policies enhance occupation-worker skill match, training
subsidies, and unemployment benefits.
A number of studies document that the social cost of occupational and sectoral
mismatch is not negligible (Jovanovic and Moffitt (1990), Sullivan (2010), James
(2011)). Self-selecting into a better occupational match, therefore, could be an
important way to achieve more efficient allocation in the labor market. Also, important
human capital investments, such as higher education or job training, often occur within
a context of considering occupational decisions. Moreover, changing occupations
often involves considerable variation in permanent income, which has a direct impact
on household consumption and welfare. This structural model of occupational
choice given imperfect information and risk aversion could, therefore, be useful in
understanding occupational choices and other important economic behaviors within
the same context.
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean S.D. N
Demographics and pre-labor market characteristics
AFQT 49.0790 30.1438 2417
Years of Education 13.2375 2.5353 2417
Hispanic 0.1105 0.3135 2417
Black 0.0732 0.2506 2417
Age at the labor market entry 21.1386 2.9532 2417
Initial assets (log) 5.5706 2.6359 503
Wage and Occupations
Hourly wage 17.6904 10.4820 31157
Cognitive task 0.5018 0.2645 32774
Motor task 0.5291 0.2487 32774
Notes: Summary statistics for 1 pre-labor market entry characteristics: AFQT
score, years of educational attainment, race, age at labor market entry, and log
of initial money assets, such as savings account, and 2) Labor market outcomes:
hourly wage rate and task choices, using NLSY79 data from 1979-2000. Wages
and assets are in 2005 real US dollars.
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Table 1.2: Summary of Panel Data
Hourly Wage Cognitive Task Motor Task
t Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N
1 11.8307 5.7708 2284 0.4124 0.2506 2412 0.5313 0.2268 2412
2 13.0147 6.3849 2293 0.4392 0.2579 2413 0.5334 0.2312 2413
3 13.6809 6.9410 2325 0.4532 0.2619 2410 0.5366 0.2378 2410
4 14.6976 7.7216 2218 0.4678 0.2630 2321 0.5342 0.2391 2321
5 15.4201 7.8133 2045 0.4741 0.2596 2138 0.5406 0.2450 2138
6 16.5760 8.7493 1915 0.5005 0.2633 1999 0.5424 0.2513 1999
7 17.5429 9.3701 1804 0.5069 0.2638 1885 0.5395 0.2495 1885
8 18.1036 9.6347 1732 0.5113 0.2646 1812 0.5356 0.2502 1812
9 18.8502 10.2204 1647 0.5260 0.2620 1732 0.5321 0.2561 1732
10 19.1571 10.3732 1592 0.5243 0.2668 1658 0.5214 0.2506 1658
11 19.8593 11.1129 1525 0.5339 0.2633 1597 0.5248 0.2586 1597
12 20.2770 11.2297 1452 0.5418 0.2650 1523 0.5126 0.2549 1523
13 20.5647 11.4465 1381 0.5380 0.2671 1455 0.5156 0.2560 1455
14 21.1374 12.0812 1297 0.5465 0.2627 1372 0.5124 0.2573 1372
15 22.0019 12.9901 1200 0.5417 0.2648 1264 0.5182 0.2575 1264
16 22.0607 13.2607 1069 0.5442 0.2585 1155 0.5231 0.2588 1155
17 22.0675 12.8598 928 0.5549 0.2523 1000 0.5294 0.2631 1000
18 22.1935 13.0519 781 0.5550 0.2544 834 0.5247 0.2626 834
19 23.3223 13.7584 641 0.5610 0.2543 694 0.5186 0.2594 694
20 23.0562 13.0674 460 0.5554 0.2525 488 0.5198 0.2582 488
21 23.0695 11.9703 323 0.5538 0.2566 353 0.5120 0.2588 353
22 23.4238 12.3660 245 0.5436 0.2525 259 0.5147 0.2596 259
Notes: The means and the standard deviations, along with the number of
observations for hourly wage, cognitive task, and motor task for years after labor
market entry (t) from the NLSY79 data (1979-2000). Wages are in 2005 real US
dollars.
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Table 1.3: Log Wage Regressions
(1) (2)
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adj. R2 0.231 0.145
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. xc,t and
xm,t indicate the cognitive and motor tasks respectively. Tenure indicates occupational
tenure. Education is measured by years.
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adj. R2 0.548 0.480
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. xc,t and xm,t indicate the cognitive and motor
tasks respectively. Tenure indicates occupational tenure.
Signal is the predicted residual from the OLS regression.
Dummy variable Dc,t = 1 indicates xc,t > xm,t.
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adj. R2 0.547 0.480
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01. xc,t and xm,t indicate the cognitive and motor
tasks respectively. Tenure indicates occupational tenure.
Signal is the predicted residual from the fixed effect regression.
Dummy variable Dc,t = 1 indicates xc,t > xm,t.
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Table 1.6: Wage and Risk Preference Parameters




Reward for task (B1c, B1m) 14.5424 5.3875
(4.8243) (2.1358)
Cost for mismatch (B2c, B2m) 28.5607 19.2269
(1.8486) (2.9714)
Interaction with skill (B3c, B3m) 27.3512 20.6370
(6.5409) (3.1327)
Std. of wage shock (σε) 0.5045
(0.2970)
Risk preference
CRRA coefficient ρ 3.8666
(1.6216)
Notes: Parameter estimates and standard errors (in brackets) for the wage and
risk preference parameters. Wage parameters are the determinants for hourly
wage rate, and risk preference parameter represents the estimates for coefficient
of the CRRA utility function.
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Table 1.7: Skill Accumulation and Initial Skills Parameters
Cognitive Task Motor Task
Skill accumulation
(A1c, A1m) 0.0479 0.0663
(0.0151) (0.0286)
(A2c, A2m) 0.0023 -0.0742
(0.0132) (0.0418)
Std. of skill accumulation shock (ση) 0.1081 0.0580
(0.0299) (0.0136)
Initial skills
Intercept (H0c, H0m) -1.2069 1.4885
(0.4533) (0.0851)
AFQT score (H1c, H1m) 0.0027 -0.0012
(0.0012) (0.0011)
Years of education (H2c, H2m) 0.1028 -0.0519
(0.0256) (0.0087)
Std. of initial skill shock (ση0) 0.3616 0.2737
(0.0868) (0.0376)
Initial belief
Std. of initial belief distribution (σs0) 0.3212 0.3866
(0.0967) (0.0954)
Notes: Parameter estimates and standard errors (in brackets) for skill accumula-
tion and initial skill determination. Both deterministic and stochastic elements
in skill accumulation and initial skills are separately estimated for each skill
dimension, cognitive and motor.
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Table 1.8: Life-Cycle Wage Profiles:
Skill Uncertainty vs. Perfect Information
Low Wealth High Wealth
t Uncertainty Perfect Info. Uncertainty Perfect Info.
1 7.1563 9.5202 16.2367 17.5047
2 8.7742 9.8499 17.6144 18.2162
3 9.5224 10.2101 18.3133 18.8986
4 9.8739 10.5946 18.9814 19.6188
5 10.1794 10.9723 19.6510 20.3458
6 10.5170 11.3464 20.3811 21.1048
7 10.8772 11.7775 21.1224 21.9584
8 11.2332 12.1921 21.9257 22.7993
9 11.6360 12.6394 22.7999 23.6678
10 12.0277 13.0984 23.7412 24.5417
11 12.3827 13.5565 24.6485 25.4814
12 12.7948 14.0349 25.4134 26.3307
13 13.2324 14.5196 26.1842 27.1259
14 13.5978 15.0078 26.9423 28.0135
15 14.1359 15.5245 27.9774 28.9257
16 14.5943 16.0212 28.8376 29.7521
17 14.5462 16.5922 29.3503 30.3500
18 15.5865 17.1150 30.0801 30.9501
19 16.0646 17.6465 31.0962 31.7995
20 16.5295 18.2040 31.5660 31.8269
Notes: Hourly wage profiles for workers with and without skill uncertainty, by first-period
wealth level. Low (high) wealth indicates that initial assets are lower (higher) than the
median.
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Table 1.9: Baby Bonds Simulation
Annual Supplemental
Payment
Annual Income Ratio Original Sample $1000 $2000
Bottom 50%/ Top 50% 0.5131 0.5157 0.5319
Bottom 25%/ Top 25% 0.3495 0.3548 0.3819
Bottom 10%/ Top 10% 0.2466 0.2561 0.3002
Notes: Simulation results for the effect of the proposed Baby Bonds policy on
income inequalities over the life-cycle. Income ratios between average annual
incomes by wealth groups are defined by 10%, 25%, and 50% of the first period
of wealth distribution.
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Figure 1.1: Predicted Log Initial Assets
Notes: Predicted log initial assets at labor market entry. Predicted using the
NLSY79 samples that have records of initial money asset holdings (such as a
savings account), and years of education, AFQT score, first period wage rate
and race.
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Figure 1.2: Occupation Choice
Notes: Average occupation choice profiles by education level. Education is indicated as
high if the final education level attained is some college or above; low if the final level
is high school graduate or lower.
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Figure 1.3: Hourly Wage
Notes: Average hourly wage rate profiles by education level. Education is
indicated as high if the final education level attained is some college or above;
low if the final level is high school graduate or lower.
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Figure 1.4: Average Belief by Education Level
Notes: Average belief profiles of simulated data by education level. Education is
indicated as high if the final education level attained is some college or above; low if
the final level is high school graduate or lower. Panels (a) and (b) show the mean of
noisy belief for cognitive and motor skill, respectively, and Panels (c) and (d) show the
standard deviation of the belief regarding cognitive and motor skill over the life cycle.
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Figure 1.5: Wage Distribution: Interquartile Range and Median
Notes: Hourly wage interquartiles and median, by education level. Education is
indicated as high is the final education level attained is some college or above; low if
the final level is high school graduate or lower.
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Figure 1.6: Benefits of Learning
Notes: Dashed line indicates the average wage profiles for workers only with skill
accumulation. Solid line represents the average wage profiles for the baseline
model with both learning and skill accumulation effects. True skills and beliefs
are fixed at the beginning of the life cycle.
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Figure 1.7: Under-Investment in Occupational Choice
Notes: Dashed line indicates optimal cognitive task choices for a worker without
skill uncertainty at each asset level; circles show optimal choices for an individual
with skill uncertainty. True skills and beliefs are fixed at the population average,
and assets are represented in the hourly dollar rate.
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Do Greater Unemployment Benefits




Budget-constrained job seekers may encounter serious consumption drops while
unemployed (Gruber (1997), Browning and Crossley (2001)). Pressed by an urgent
need for funds, they might be forced to take any available jobs, even if those jobs do
not necessarily match their skills appropriately, with the subsequent result that such
workers might experience lower productivity and earn less than what they could have
earned if they were working on tasks more suitable their competitive advantages.
Past empirical research has found that UI benefits reduce the labor supply. (Moffitt
(1985), Katz and Meyer (1990), Card and Levine (2000)). This trade-off between
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benefits and disincentives is central to the design of UI systems and to discussions
about the generosity of UI benefits. A great number of studies have attempted to
understand why UI benefits lengthen periods of unemployment, and there are two
main explanations. The first hypothesis is moral hazard from a substitution effect;
recipients of UI reduce their search efforts, as UI benefits can distort the relative costs
of leisure and consumption (Krueger and Meyer (2002), Gruber (1997)). Second, in
response to higher benefits, the reservation wage may go up, such that the probability
of a UI recipient’s accepting a new job offer diminishes (Ehrenberg and Oaxaca
(1976)).
Alternatively, Chetty (2008) suggests that a substantial share of the response to
longer UI benefits periods is attributable to a liquidity effect; UI allows liquidity-
constrained households to spend as much time as they would have spent if they
had enough funds for searching. In this way, UI benefits increase aggregate utility.
Whether or not a job seeker’s job-match quality positively correlates with the length
of time spent searching is still an open question, with mixed evidence. Most existing
empirical studies measure match quality using the post-unemployment wage or using
tenure at the new job (Card et al. (2007), Chetty (2008), Van Ours and Vodopivec
(2008)); however, while studies do find small-but-positive effects, others find none.
In this paper, I present new empirical evidence to suggest occupational choices as a
channel by which unemployment insurance (UI) benefits might affect search behavior
and result in longer unemployment durations. Recent literature on occupational
tasks (Autor et al. (2003), Bacolod et al. (2009), Yamaguchi (2012), Autor and Dorn
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(2013)) allowed researchers to evaluate a new dimension of occupational mobility:
how occupations differ in terms of the types of job tasks they entail – that is, cog-
nitive, manual, or routine skills. Using the occupational task data constructed by
Autor and Dorn (2013), I show a positive correlation between changes in occupa-
tional tasks (i.e., from one task type to another or task levels) and unemployment
durations. This evidence suggests that it takes longer to search and be matched
with an occupation that requires skillsets or skill levels that differ from previous jobs.
In turn, such a finding raises an interesting question: does additional wealth allow
workers to take the risk of spending more time on their job searches, in order to find
a better career match?
In this essay, thus, I report two findings that shed light on the positive relationship
between additional wealth and the possibility of “experimentation” in the job search.
Firstly, those with higher household wealth switch their job tasks more substantially
than those with less wealth. I further measure a match quality with a previous job by
pre-unemployment wage residuals, and find that, regardless of the level of household
wealth, those whose previous occupation was a bad match are more likely to change
their job tasks. Secondly, I show that an extension in the duration of UI benefits
appears to induce occupational change.
My empirical strategy is closely related to Chetty (2008) and Kroft and Notowidigdo
(2016), and I use cross-state variations in unemployment benefit durations during the
early ’90s. In 1991, the Extended Unemployment Compensation (EUC) program was
established to increase the number of weeks of benefits during high-unemployment
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periods, to protect people who remain unemployed longer due to the greater difficulty
in finding new jobs. As the additional benefit durations depended on state-level
unemployment rates, UI durations varied across states. Although benefit levels and
qualifications were revised five times during the EUC, one feature of the program
that remained consistent was that these benefits were provided in two tiers through
all periods. In addition, the unemployment rates during these periods were highly
correlated across time. Therefore, I group the states into two categories to create a
treatment status, depending on whether a state received higher-tier benefits or not.
Given the cross-state variations in UI benefit durations, then, I use data from
the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) panels of 1990-1994, which
cover dates before and after the EUC program’s inception in late-1991. I estimate
the average treatment effects of receiving UI benefits for longer durations, using the
Difference in Differences and Matching methods. Using the Difference in Differences
method, I find that occupational changes are more likely to be observed in the states
that qualify for higher-tier EUC after EUC is implemented, compared to states that
do not qualify. I then estimate the average treatment effect using Matching methods;
I exploit both Nearest Neighbor and Propensity Score matchings to test the effect of
the EUC on occupational changes and find consistent results using both methods.
The findings in this paper are consistent with the results in Chetty (2008): namely,
that increases in UI benefits have much larger effects on unemployment durations for
liquidity-constrained individuals than for wealthier ones. If it is to be expected that
an individual must spend a longer time searching for an occupation that has no (or
69
CHAPTER 2. DO GREATER UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS LEAD TO
BETTER MATCHES? EVIDENCE FROM EMERGENCY UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION PROGRAMS
little) connection to his or her prior experience, and if unemployed people utilize UI
benefits to subsidize these extended periods of unemployment, then it follows that
increases in UI benefits will have larger effects on search durations for people who
are financially constrained.
Although a change in occupation does not, in itself, constitute direct evidence
for an improvement in job suitability or in post-unemployment welfare, this finding
still sheds light on the possibility that UI extensions might facilitate improvements in
welfare. First of all, people who are able to extend their job search until finding a better
match might experience wage growth in the long run. Like many previous studies, the
current paper reports that there is little change in accepted wages when comparing
an individual’s wages from his/her the final year at the previous job compared to
his/her wages in the first year at the new job. However, given that individuals who
change their occupation might reasonably lack occupation-specific experience at the
start of a new job, this lack of experience might account for their lower starting
wages. Taking this possibility together with another finding in this paper – namely,
that individuals whose previous jobs were a poor match are more likely to switch
occupations – it is possible that workers are freer to seek jobs with a better fit when
they have the option of leaning on the support of extended UI benefits. Second, by
selecting new, more-suitable occupations, workers might experience improvements in
welfare that are associated with non-pecuniary job preferences.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a short summary of the
previous literature on UI and post-unemployment match quality. Section 3 introduces
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the datasets used for the empirical analysis. Section 4 examines the effects of EUC
extensions on search outcomes, namely, wage growth and occupation. Then, in Section
5, I estimate average treatment effects of EUC extensions, using the Difference in
Differences and Matching methods. Section 6 discusses the evidence for the positive
relationship between occupational change and search duration, and Section 7 provides
a sketch of an occupational search model for credit-constrained individuals. Lastly,
Section 8 concludes.
2.2 Previous studies on post-unemployment match quality
Given the universal empirical findings on the positive relationship between the
generosity of UI benefits and unemployment spells, there is little evidence to show
that generous UI benefits actually result in improved post-unemployment match
quality. In other words, it has thus far remained unclear whether UI is associated
with wage gains or with longer job tenures upon re-employment.
In Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976), the authors analyze unemployment duration
and wage gains, using samples of UI recipients and non-recipients. They estimate the
effect of the UI replacement ratio, which is defined as the ratio of weekly UI benefits
to the UI recipient’s weekly earnings at his/her former job. Their results show that
the UI replacement rate does not have a significant impact on post-employment wages,
and these results have been viewed as evidence for moral hazard in UI programs,
as well as evidence that UI might reduce recipients’ job-search efforts. Similarly,
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using Continuous Wage and Benefit History data for Pennsylvania and Arizona,
Classen (1977) estimates the effect of an increase in the weekly benefit amount on
post-unemployment wages and does not find UI to have a statistically significant
effect on accepted wages in the post-unemployment job.
Addison and Blackburn (2000), on the other hand, do find a small but statistically
significant effect in support of post-unemployment wage gains for UI recipients
(compared to non-recipients) using data from the Displaced Worker Surveys for 1988,
1990, and 1992. The authors note that their finding may be biased by virtue of their
decision to compare the recipients with non-recipients, as a similar effect is not found
when comparing recipients at different levels of benefits.
More recently, Lalive (2007) has studied the effects of small (13-week) and large
(170-week) extensions of UI benefits in Austria. The author finds that the more
time-generous benefit programs seem to lengthen unemployment durations; however,
these do not affect post-unemployment match quality, as measured by re-employment
wage gains.
Using data from Austria and Slovenia, respectively, two recent studies – Card et al.
(2007) and Van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) – examine multiple aspects of match
quality, such as post-unemployment job duration and the probability of finding a
permanent rather than a temporary job, in addition to wage changes. However, again,
these authors find UI benefits to have little or no effect on post-unemployment match
quality.
The current paper adds to the previous literature by testing and identifying the
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effects of UI programs on a new aspect of post-unemployment job match: occupational
change. Occupational change alone is not direct evidence for improvements in worker-
job match quality. However, this new aspect of search behavior sheds light on potential
welfare improvements, taken together with two other findings in this paper; first,
workers who were found to be poorly matched with the previous job also tend to
experience larger shifts in terms of job tasks, and secondly, additional wealth have
positive impacts on occupational changes.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Dictionary of Occupational Titles
Starting from Autor et al. (2003), a growing body of studies (Ingram and Neumann
(2006), Bacolod et al. (2009), Yamaguchi (2012), Autor and Dorn (2013)) take a new
approach to define occupations, using task data from the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles (DOT) or from its successor, the Occupational Information Network (O*NET).
DOT and O*NET contain detailed task information on 12,099 distinct occupations.
Each occupation is evaluated with respect to 62 characteristics, such as aptitudes,
temperaments, necessary training time, and physical demand. Ingram and Neumann
(2006), Bacolod et al. (2009), and Yamaguchi (2012) categorize these job charac-
teristics by assigning them to just one of two dimensions – cognitive or motor –
and define each occupation by task intensity. By contrast, Autor et al. (2003) and
Autor and Dorn (2013) consider three skill dimensions – abstract, manual, and routine
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– in analyzing the allocation of tasks between labor and capital, due to technological
changes in the labor market.
In this paper, I use the three continuous task measures (abstract, routine, and
manual) established by Autor and Dorn (2013). The measures are constructed from
the DOT and matched to their corresponding three-digit Census occupation classifica-
tions. They collapse the original five task measures of Autor et al. (2003) to three task
aggregates. The abstract task measure is the average of two DOT variables: “direction
control and planning” and “GED Math,” which measure managerial, mathematical,
and formal reasoning requirements. The routine task measure is the average of two
DOT variables: “set limits, tolerances, and standards” and “finger dexterity.” And the
manual task measure corresponds to the DOT variable “eye-hand-foot coordination.”
Table 2.1 indicates the average task intensities for five major occupation groups.
Managerial and professional specialty occupations, on average, have the highest
abstract task scores, while Precision production, craft, and repair occupations have
the highest routine and manual task scores. The lowest abstract task score was for
operators, fabricators, and laborers, and the lowest routine task score was observed
in the service occupations. Finally, the lowest manual task score was found among
technical, sales, and administrative support occupations.
An advantage of using task-based occupational definitions rather than traditional
categorization methods is that task-based definitions allow for evaluating whether
two distinct occupations are similar or not. In addition, continuous task measures
carry a computational advantage. In this way, despite the fact that the tripartite
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dimensional scheme accounts for a very low objective number of job characteristics,
these categories (in combination) still account for theoretically infinite types of work;
thus, researchers can still work conveniently with a large number of occupations.
2.3.2 Extended Unemployment Compensation
In the United States, UI benefits are normally provided for 26 weeks under the
federal Unemployment Compensation (UC) program established by the Social Security
Act of 1935. The UC program is periodically extended by a permanent Extended
Benefits (EB) program or by temporary programs during economic downturns to
protect people who (during a downturn) remain unemployed longer-than-normal due
to the (temporarily) greater difficulty in finding new jobs. The permanent EB program
was enacted in 1970 and provides one-half of regular benefits up to a maximum of
13 weeks. This program can be activated in a specific state if its adjusted insured
unemployment rate (AIUR)1 for 13 weeks is 4% or higher and if the quarterly average
is at least 20% higher than the average of the previous 2 years. Meanwhile, the EB
program can be activated nationally when the national IUR is 4.5% or higher for at
least 3 consecutive months.
A temporary program, the Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) Act
of 19912 was established to increase the duration of UI benefits during periods of
1The insured unemployment rate is defined as the average of continuing UC claims for 13 weeks,
divided by the average number of individuals in UC-covered employment over the first 4 of the last
6 quarters.
2Source: Emergency Unemployment Compensation: the 1990’s Experience, Revised Edition,
U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration,VI Occasional Paper 99-4.
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high unemployment. The EUC program was signed into law November 15, 1991, and
paid benefits through April 30, 1994. The EUC was superseded the EB program. A
state that triggered on to EB had to drop from it in order to qualify for EUC. Also,
an individual’s EUC entitlement was reduced by any EB received under the EUC
program.
The EUC program was revised five times, creating a complex web of benefit
durations and levels across states. During that time (i.e., its November 1991 inception
through the end of April 1994), a total of $27.9 billion in benefits was paid to recipients,
and 5 million individuals exhausted their EUC benefits. Benefit durations and benefit
tiers depended on the legislation of the time, across the five different iterations of
the program’s terms and conditions, as well as on state-level unemployment rates.
Although the benefit levels and qualifications were revised five times, benefits were
provided in effectively just two tiers3 throughout all periods. Figure 2.1 shows a
summary of cross-state variations in total weeks of UI benefits available during EUC
periods. Two graphs in panel A indicate the high and low tiers of UI benefits, and
panel B shows the mean and standard deviations across states. The spread between
the two tiers was typically 6-7 weeks, and both the means and the standard deviations
across states increased drastically from late-1991 to early-1992, decreasing thereafter.
Table 2.2 shows the additional weeks of EUC benefits for each tier by legislation,
January 1999.
3The first legislation that was effective from November 17, 1991 to February 8, 1992 had three
benefit tiers: 20, 13, and 6 weeks added to a recipient’s regular unemployment compensations.
However, all states were qualified and received either 20 or 13 additional weeks of unemployment
benefits.
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and the number of weeks benefits that each state received. Data on Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands are not available. Furthermore, Maine, Vermont, Iowa, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Alaska, Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming are excluded, as SIPP
does not provide unique state identifiers. The table, thus, includes the 14 states that
qualified for Tier 2 benefits for at least one week during the legislative periods, while
the remaining 27 states remained always in Tier 1. We can see that most states were
in Tier 2 during the fourth and fifth legislative periods. For this reason, I focus only
on the first three legislative periods, from November 17, 1991 to March 5, 1993.
Given the complexity of temporary UI laws during this period and the inadequate
information on the date of UI claims, it is difficult to predict each individual’s benefit
level precisely. Therefore, I group the states into two categories, depending on the
benefit tier in which each state found itself during the first three legislative periods,
in order to construct a treatment variable. However, since the benefit level was able
to change at any time depending on the state’s unemployment rates, 12 out of 41
states are ‘misclassified’ for some weeks. The last column of Table 2.2 indicates the
number of weeks deviated from Tier 2 from November 17, 1991 to March 5, 1993,
where the deviation is 0 if a state was in Tier 2 the entire time and 68 if it was in
Tier 1 the entire time. I use two measures of the treatment status, τb and τs, where
τb = 1 if the number of weeks deviated from Tier 2 is less than 34 weeks, and τs = 1
if less than 20 weeks.
The two dummy variables τb and τs are time-invariant. However, as Table 2.2
shows, the number of potential weeks by state often changes over different periods.
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Therefore, in addition to the two treatment status variables, τb and τs, I also test
allowing the impacts of the EUC to vary by legislation period. For unemployment
spells that stretch continuously across multiple periods, I assume the potential weeks
to be based on the beginning of their unemployment spells.
2.3.3 Survey of Income and Program Participation
The ideal unemployment data for this paper are panels that include individual
records of pre- and post-unemployment periods, as before-and-after comparison allows
for a true measure of occupational change. Also, data on the availability of household
assets are crucial in determining the effects that wealth might have on occupational
change. At the same time, the ideal dataset should be time-expansive enough to
contain observations both pre- and post-dating the policy intervention. Considering
all of these factors, I use data from the 1990, 1991, and 1992 panels of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation (SIPP), starting from January 1990 to August
1994; this date range is possible because each SIPP panel entails household surveys
that continue for 2-4 years from the starting date, at 4-month intervals. The SIPP data
contain information on weekly employment status, UI benefit status, and household
assets.
To measure search durations, I follow Chetty (2008). I use weekly employment
status (ES) from the SIPP data. ES can take any one of the following values: 1.
With a job this week; 2. With a job, absent without pay, no time on layoff this week;
3. With a job, absent without pay, spent time on payoff this week; 4. Looking for
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a job this week; 5. Without a job, not looking for a job, not on layoff. Following
Chetty (2008), I also define the duration of job separation by summing the number
of weeks that ES >=3, starting at the time of job separation (i.e., when a change in
ES from 1 or 2 to 3, 4, or 5 first becomes apparent) and stopping when the individual
finds a job that lasts for at least 4 weeks (i.e., respondent reports on 4 consecutive
occasions that ES = 1 or 2). The search duration is defined as a period of active job
search, summing the number of weeks that a respondent reports that ES = 4. In case
the tenure on a new job is less than 1 month, the search duration is calculated by
summing the number of weeks in which ES = 4, until the person finds another job
that lasts for 4 weeks, and the number of weeks in between wherein ES = 1 or 2 is
excluded.
I restrict the samples to prime-age males between the ages of 18 and 65 who have
at least 3 months of work history and appear in a panel for at least 3 months. The
unemployment start date is considered to be when a worker with at least 3 months
of work history becomes separated from a job. I exclude those who experienced their
first job separation after March 1993, in order to cover the first three of the five EUC
legislations. I further restrict the sample to those who are matched with a new job
within the sample periods, excluding those who were still unemployed by the end
date of the panel in question. I also exclude anyone on temporary layoff. In the
end, I include only those people who lost jobs on or before March 1993, and the
unemployment spells go as late as August 1994. Some have multiple unemployment
spells in the data and have multiple observations. The final sample consists of 4,502
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unemployment spells, 3,709 individuals, and an average of 1.21 unemployment spells
per person.
To focus on the first three EUC legislations, I select only people who lost jobs
on or before March 1993, leaving 1,248 unemployment spells that starts separations
after March 1993 truncated. We may observe search outcomes and total search
durations only for those who are successfully matched with new jobs during the
panels. Therefore, individuals with shorter search durations are more likely to be
selected in the sample, resulting a right-censoring problem. To adjust for this selection
bias, I use a two-step sample correction method developed by Heckman (1979).
Table 2.3 presents summary statistics for the SIPP samples used in this paper.
Note that wage information is missing for some samples that have records for pre- and
post-unemployemnt occupations. The average tasks before and after unemployment
are similar to each other. Scores for abstract, routine, and manual tasks before job
separation are 2.234, 4.34, and 1.7, respectively; in post-unemployment occupations,
these are 2.221, 4.28, and 1.714, respectively. The average of the task scores across
all 3-digit Census occupations are, respectively, 2.886, 4.627, and 1.308. Therefore,
the unemployment SIPP samples have relatively lower abstract and routine tasks
compared to the average across all occupations, while the SIPP is higher than the
average on manual tasks.
The average ln wage is also similar before and after job separation. The average
ln wage before unemployment is 5.520 for the whole samples, and 5.592 for those who
have post-unemployment wage data, while the mean post-unemployment ln wage is
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5.677.
2.4 Effects of UI on Post-Unemployment Wages and Occupa-
tions
As in the previous studies discussed in Section 2, I do not find any evidence to
suggest that UI increases a job seeker’s accepted wages after unemployment. As in
Card et al. (2007), I define wage growth hi = ln(wni )− ln(w
p
i ) where wni is individual
i’s wage in the first year at the post-unemployment job, and (wpi ) is the wage in the
final year at the previous job.
To evaluate effects of UI on post-unemployment wages, I use only samples after
EUC is implemented to estimate the following OLS regression,
hi = µ0 + µ1τi + θX̃it + εit (2.1)
A treatment status τi = 1 indicates the eligibility for the Tier 2 UI extension as defined
in the previous section. Controls X̃it include search durations, age, age squared, years
of education, a race dummy, and quartiles of household wealth distribution.
In addition, I test whether the UI benefit extension has affected occupational
changes, using a similar specification, but replacing wage growth hi to the distance be-
tween pre- and post-unemployment occupations, Di. Di is measured by the Euclidean
distance in three-dimensional occupational tasks, according to Autor and Dorn (2013)
’s categories: abstract, routine, and manual.
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iR, and T kiM are abstract, routine, and manual task intensities, respectively, and
k indicates pre- (k = n) and post- (k = p) unemployment. Therefore, Di measures
how different the new occupation is compared to the previous job.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 present summary statistics of covariates by the treatment
statuses τb and τs and their differences. Both wage and occupational distance are
higher in the treated group, and the difference is bigger between τs = 1 and τs = 0
compared to the difference between τb = 1 and τb = 0. Similar trend is found in
search duration (weeks) and net liquid household assets. Black respondents make up
about 10% of the whole sample, and the population is slightly larger in the control
groups. The three job task measures, as well as age and years of education, are not
significantly different between the two groups.
The regression results in Table 2.6 are also consistent with the findings in existing
studies on the effects of UI on accepted wages. Table 2.6 examines the effects of
treatment status τ , the eligibility for the longer UI extensions. Columns (1) and (3)
include only age and its squared term as controls, and Columns (2) and (4) add the
full control set, including education, a race dummy, household wealth distribution
quartiles, and search durations. Regardless of how the treatment group is defined,
for both τb and τs, a respondent’s eligibility for the longer UI extensions does not
have a statistically significant effect on his post-unemployment wage growth, hi. The
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coefficients of the treatment status for all four regressions are positive, but close to
0 and not significant. Search durations do not have any significant effect on wage
growth either, as shown in columns (2) and (4).
Estimation results in Table 2.7 show that the treatment status τ , however, affects
post-unemployment occupational choices. Changes in occupational task, Di increase
with eligibility for longer UI extensions. Both treatment status τb and τs have similar
levels of coefficients without additional controls, 1.848 and 1.949, respectively. With
full controls, then, the coefficients on τb and τs are 1.150 and 1.658, respectively, and
the τb coefficient is not statistically significant. Search durations – that is, weeks of
unemployment while searching for a job – are also positively related to occupational
change, as shown in Columns (2) and (4). Therefore, those who spend longer searching
for a job are more likely to switch occupational tasks when reemployed.
Although an immediate improvement in wages is not evident, occupational changes
as a response to UI benefit extensions do imply that not all behavioral responses
to more generous UI benefits are explained by moral hazard; when they can avail
themselves of more funds during the search period, it seems that workers may expand
their searches to include new occupations with which they have no previous experience.
This explanation is consistent with the findings in Chetty (2008) that increases in UI
benefits have much larger effects on unemployment durations for liquidity-constrained
individuals. If it is to be expected that searching for a new occupation will require
more time than searching for a more familiar one, and if unemployed people utilize
UI benefits to subsidize extended periods of unemployment while they find a new
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job, then increases in UI benefits should have larger effects on search duration when
people are credit-constrained.
In the following section, I will explore the effects of UI extensions on occupational
change in more detail, using the Difference in Differences and Matching methods.
2.5 Average Treatment Effects of UI on Occupational Changes
2.5.1 Difference in Differences Analysis
The outcome of interest is the distance between the observed pre- and post-
unemployment occupations, Di. Using a treatment status τi = 1, eligibility for Tier
1 UI extension, I first analyze the average treatment effect of EUC on occupational
change by the conventional DID approach. T = 0 indicates pre-EUC spells that
began before November 1991, even if a given spell ended after November 1991, and
T = 1 indicates post-EUC spells that began in or after November 1991.
Table 2.8 shows the average occupational distance by treatment status for pre-
and post-spells. We can see that the occupational distance is greater in the treatment
group on average. Moreover, it increases after EUC in the treatment group, while it
decreases after EUC in the control group. Difference in difference is higher for τs = 1
than τb = 1.
Dit = β0 + β1gi + β
j
2Qij + β31T + β41τ + β51T1τ + γXit + εit. (2.3)
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Qij is an indicator variable that = 1 if individual i belongs to quartile j of the wealth
distribution. And 1T = 1 indicates a time period after the treatment event. Control
Xit includes current occupational task levels, age. To interpret β5 as an average
treatment effect of EUC, it is required that the average outcomes for the treated
and control groups would have followed parallel paths over time in the absence of
the treatment. Finally, gi denotes the wage signal for individual i derived from the
following ln wage regression.
ln wageit = α0t + α1task + α2task
2 + γ′X ′it + µi + δtηit, (2.4)
where X ′it includes educational attainment, race dummies, age, and age squared. µi
represents state fixed effects, and δt represents year fixed effects. Wage signal gi is
the residual from the ln wage equation (2.4). Therefore, gi, which is the excessive
wages from the previous occupation, is used as a proxy for the match quality from the
previous job. Workers make occupational choices based on their past experience. In
particular, workers can change occupations to insure themselves against earnings risks
attributable to a poor match with job tasks. Workers whose previous occupations
were a bad match might adapt themselves to different kinds of tasks, and those
who are well matched in their current occupations would likely stay with similar
occupations (in terms of job tasks) going forward.
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2.5.2 Truncated Distribution and Correction for Sample Selection Bias
The dependent variable distance Di is observed only if an individual is successfully
matched with a new job within the panel in question, resulting in a right-censoring
problem. Individuals with shorter unemployment spells are more likely to be included
in the sample. To adjust for this selection bias, I use the two-step sample correction
method developed by Heckman (1979).
The occupational distance Di is observed only if
γ0 + γ1ni + γ2X̃i + µi + ui > 0. (2.5)
ni indicates the year and month when individual i is separated from a job. ni is
a monthly time variable, starting from January 1990 where ni = 1 to March 1993
where ni = 39. The later that an individual lost his job, it would be more likely that
he was not ultimately matched successfully with a new job and thus was omitted
from the data. X̃it includes search durations, age, age squared, years of education,
race dummy, and quartiles of household wealth distribution, while µi represents state
fixed effects.
Table 2.9 shows estimates from the Probit regression in equation (2.5). Calendar
year and month at job losses and the current search durations are negatively related
to the sample selection. On the other hand, older people and people who engaged
more in (as represented by higher scores on) abstract tasks in their previous job are
more likely to find a job before the panel ends and are included in the sample. From
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selection equation (2.5), I construct the non-selection hazard, or the inverse of Mill’s
ratio lambdai = θ(Zi)1−Θ(Zi) , where Zi is the predicted selection probability.
2.5.3 Results
Table 2.10 shows the classic difference in differences estimation result. Specification
(1) does not include the non-selection hazard, lambda, while Specifications (2), (3),
and (4) include it to correct the selection bias caused by the truncated distribution
of occupational distance. In addition to lambda, Specification (3) includes dummies
for each legislation period for EUC, and Specification (4) includes legislation period
dummies and their interactions with EUC status in each state for that period. For
some states that changed their EUC status within a given period, I assigned 1 if the
state was in the higher tier for the majority of that time; otherwise I assigned 0.
For all four specifications, the average treatment effect of EUC is positive and
statistically significant, and the estimates are higher for taus than taub. The coefficient
is larger and more significant with the controls for legislation period dummies p1, p2
their interactions with EUC status in each state for that period. The negative
time specific effect was strongest during the first legislation period, which is in the
beginning of the recession. And the effect of EUC weakest in the last period of
legislation, p.
Regardless of the treatment status, household assets play an important role in
occupational task changes. Qj is an indicator variable for the jth quartile of the
wealth distribution. Those who are in the 3rd and 4th quartiles are more likely to
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switch their jobs more drastically compared to the people in the 1st and 2nd quartiles.
There are two possible explanations for this finding. The first explanation centers on
the fact that unemployment search duration is highly correlated with occupational
change; the data show that the bigger a change is, the longer it has likely taken a
worker to be successfully matched with his new job – and we can surmise that only
those who are not liquidity-constrained can afford to wait through longer searches.
The finding here supports Chetty (2008)’s findings that the effect of unemployment
benefit extension on search duration is much larger for workers with low household
liquidity. The second explanation is consistent with the positive relationship between
wealth and optimal levels of occupational risk taking, as addressed in Bahk (2020).
If workers are uncertain about their skill levels, then choosing occupations that
require very different (combinations of) occupational tasks is risky, since a worker’s
productivity and potential earnings in the new occupation would be unknown; as
such, only those workers with greater wealth might be able to take on the bigger risks
associated with changing one’s occupation substantially.
Another key variable in Table 2.10 is the signal from equation (2.4). The negative
coefficients on the signal suggest that workers with low productivity signals from
their previous job are more likely to make bigger changes in occupational tasks, and
those with good signals are matched again with rather similar occupations after
unemployment. The estimates are similar in all specifications and range from -1.523
to -1.566. This result is consistent with the findings in Arcidiacono et al. (2016) that
workers with positive wage residuals are more likely to stay in the same occupation.
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Wage regression results, as well as the estimates exploited to derive the signals, are
presented in Table 2.11.
Also, the occupational changes drop significantly with age, which is consistent with
the classic findings in the search and matching literatures that occupational change
is particularly active in the beginning of a worker’s career. Meanwhile, although
unemployment rates have strongly negative correlations with search durations, they
do not have a significant impact on occupational change.
2.5.4 Matching Methods
Methods and Results
One of the key benefits of randomized experiments in estimating causal effects is
that both observed and unobserved covariates in the treated group are only randomly
different from the control group. Unfortunately, in many non-experimental studies,
the status of having received a treatment is not always independent of the treated
units’ characteristics; in such cases, if the treated units’ outcomes are at least partly
determined by some of these factors, the treatment process itself may result in
selection bias (Rubin (1973), Heckman et al. (1998)). Therefore, when estimating
causal effects in non-experimental studies, it is desirable to reduce bias as much as
possible by obtaining well-matched treated and control groups with similar covariates.
As shown in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, which present summary statistics of covariates in
treated and control groups and their differences, a simple comparison suggests that
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there is a room to improve the balance between the two groups. For both broad (τb)
and narrow (τs) distinctions, there are significant discrepancies in the distributions,
although the differences are bigger in the narrow treatment group. ln wage, signal,
and occupational distance are slightly higher in the treated group, as well as household
net liquid assets. Job task measures, years of education, and age are not significantly
different between the two groups.
Matching methods (Althauser and Rubin (1970), Rubin (1973)) are based on the
idea of balancing the distribution of covariates in the treated and control groups
to compare the outcomes of subjects that are as similar as possible with the sin-
gle exception of their treatment status. Matching methods include matching in
covariates (Abadie and Imbens (2002)), and methods based on propensity score
(Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984), Hirano et al. (2003)). In this paper, I use both near-
est neighbor matching and propensity score matching to compare similar units between
the treatment and control group.
Nearest neighbor matching entails finding the closest pairs of observations with
regard to a set of covariates.
D̂i(0) =

Di if τ i = 0
D̄l(i) if τ i = 1
(2.6)
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D̄l(i) if τ i = 0
Di if τ i = 1
(2.7)
D̄l(i) indicates the average of Mth closest units (in terms of covariates Xi) in the
opposite treatment group, where M is the number of matches. Then the simple







However, unless the covariates are exactly matched, there may still be bias due to
the difference in the covariates, even though the difference is smaller after matching.
Regardless, to account for this possible bias, I adjust using a linear function of
covariates as suggested in Abadie and Imbens (2002).
Propensity score matching is an alternative to the nearest neighbor matching
method. Instead of correcting the bias that may arise in cases where all covariates are
not exactly matched, propensity score matching matches on the estimated predicted
probabilities of treatment, also known as the propensity scores. The propensity score
naturally includes all information about the covariates and can perform as a single
covariate for use in matching.
Table 2.12 shows the matching estimators. The matched covariates comprise the
three task-type measures, a wage signal git from the pre-unemployment job (equation
(2.3)), household net liquidity quartiles, age, race, and years of education. Since the
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available sample includes numbers of controls and the treated, I used a single match in
the estimation. Selecting multiple matches generally increases bias, since the second
or next-closest controls are further away from the treated unit than is the absolute
closest match. However, when the sample size is small, utilizing multiple matches can
decrease variance by increasing the matched sample size. For both treatment groups,
the matching estimators for the average treatment effect are significantly positive,
ranging from 1.284 to 1.855.
Discussions for Unconfoundedness and Overlap assumptions
There are two assumptions critical to identifying the treatment impact using
matching methods. The first assumption is “unconfoundedness” which is also referred
to as exogeneity (or the conditional independence assumption), formally articulated
in Rubin (1990),
τi ⊥ (Di(0), Di(1)) |Xi. (2.9)
Conditional on the covariates Xi, the outcomes δi are independent with the treatment
status τi. Unconfoundedness is an important condition when estimating casual effects
using observational data, which assures that the assignment to treatment is based
on observational pre-treatment variables only. In many non-experimental studies,
assessing the plausibility of the unconfoundedness assumption can be a challenge. In
this study, the assignment rule for τi = 1 is clear: it depends on a single variable, which
is the state’s unemployment rate. However, there may exist unobserved systematic
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differences in the covariates that affect occupational changes and this unemployment
rate, hence the treatment and control status.
The unconfoundedness assumption is not testable, since only one of the outcomes
for each treatment status is observable. However, researchers can assess the plausibility
of this assumption by estimating the causal effect of the treatment on a pseudo-
outcome, which is a variable known to be unaffected by the treatment. I use the
samples before the treatment status; therefore, the value is determined prior to the
treatment, to perform (otherwise-identical) matching estimations. Table 2.13 reports
that for all four specifications, the matching estimators are insignificant and close to
0, showing that the unconfoundedness assumption is plausible.
The second assumption is overlap. The overlap assumption states that each
individual has a positive probability of receiving the treatment. Formally, the overlap
assumption requires that for each possible X in the population,
0 < Pr(τ = 1|X) < 1. (2.10)
where Pr(τ = 1|X) is a propensity score. The overlap assumption is satisfied when
there is a positive probability of seeing observations in both the treatment and
the control group given each combination of covariates. Figure 2.2 shows the two
estimated densities of the predicted probabilities of being treated using the covariates
X. Both plots have its mass in the middle, not near 0 or 1, and there is a sufficient
overlap between the two groups. Therefore it is plausible to say that the overlap
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assumption is not violated.
2.6 Search Durations and Changes in Occupation
In this section, I provide evidence for a positive relationship between occupational
changes and search durations using a simple OLS regression. There are various kinds
of potential risk involved in choosing a new job that entails different kinds of job tasks.
A model of task-specific job searching (Bahk (2020)) shows that job seekers with
higher household assets tend to move further in terms of (change in) occupational
tasks. At the same time, a positive relationship between occupational changes and
search durations suggests another potential risk when changing occupations; it may
take longer to search for jobs outside of one’s field of experience.
search durationsi = ζ0 + ζ1Di + ζ2wi + ζ3gi + γ′X ′i + νi (2.11)
Table 2.14 shows estimation results for the OLS regression (equation (2.9)), where Xi
includes state unemployment rates, year-specific effects, and individual characteristics,
such as age, years of education, race, and household liquidity asset levels. Search
durations are measured as the weeks of unemployment periods people have reported
that they are actively searching for a job.
Search durations are likely extended with higher unemployment rates. Also as
people age, it is likely that finding a new job will take them longer. Household
net liquidity assets, on the other hand, do not seem to have a significant impact
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on job search durations. While productivity signals from a respondent’s previous
job are negatively correlated with search duration, this relationship might relate to
unobserved characteristics, such as search efforts or innate ability – or it may be partly
attributable to the fact that people with low wage signals from their previous jobs
are more like to choose a different sort of job, involving different tasks. Interestingly,
then, when controlling for the productivity signal, higher wages at the previous job
are positively correlated with unemployment duration. Lastly, search duration and
occupational change show a positive and significant relationship.
2.7 An Occupational Search Model
In this section, I sketch a simple occupational search model. This model builds
on Card et al. (2007) and on Chetty (2008), who developed job search models with a
borrowing constraint. One major difference from the search models is that the agents
choose occupational distance (i.e., the magnitude of the change in occupational task
types) dt when they become unemployed, instead of search efforts. In addition, utility
when employed depends on the match quality with a new occupation. I make the
following two assumptions for simplicity: first, I assume that all jobs last indefinitely
once matched, and second, I assume that wages are exogenously fixed.
Time is discrete in a finite horizon. Agents become unemployed at t = 0. An
agent chooses occupational distance dt ∈ [0, d̄]. If dt = 0, then the occupation is
same as in the previous job. Distance dt affects the probability of a successful match,
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p(dt), which I assume p′(dt) < 0. Therefore, as dt increases, the agent is less likely
to be matched with a new job. δ denotes a time discount rate, and r is the fixed
interest rate. m(dt, g) denotes match quality in the new job, where the match quality
is determined by the productivity signal from the previous occupation g and by the
distance dt. If the search is successful, the agent begins working and receive wage
wt until the end of the periods. If the agent fails to find a job in period t, the agent
receives an unemployment benefit bt and searches again in period t+ 1.
The value function for an agent who are matched with a job in period t, given
























p(dt)Vt(At) + (1− p(dt))Ut(At). (2.14)
An unemployed individual chooses dt to maximize expected utility given by equation
(2.13). Given the level of assets At and the productivity signal g from the previous
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occupation, the first order condition that the optimal distance d∗t ∈ (0, b̄) is




and the optimal distance d∗t = 0 if
∂m(dt,g)
(∂dt)
≤ 0 given g.
The optimal occupational distance is determined by the productivity signal g.
Intuitively, an unemployed individual who was well matched at his previous occupation
would be better off looking for the same job tasks or even the same exact occupation.
However, if the match quality was very low, the agent might choose dt > 0 in order
to increase his match quality at his next job, even if the probability of a successful
match (in such a case) is lower.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, I suggest and test occupational choices as a new channel between
UI benefits and longer unemployment durations. Using cross-state variations in weeks
of UI benefits available in the early 1990s, I find that unemployed individuals with
higher levels of wealth search for different kinds of jobs with different task levels
than do individuals with lower levels of wealth. Also, using different levels of EUC
extensions as a treatment status, I find similar behavioral responses to UI benefits
extensions, as though these benefits function as a stand-in for wealth. I control for
previous occupation and previous job’s match quality, and I find that people tend to
“experiment” and move further away from their previous occupations when they are
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supported by UI for longer periods.
The occupational choices of the unemployed offer insight into a “new” possible
facet of the value of UI, one that has previously not received enough attention. In
particular, the fact that people whose previous jobs were a poor match are more
like to change their occupational tasks when they have greater household assets or
more generous UI benefits highlights some potential welfare improvements for credit-
constrained workers. However, occupational change itself dose not provide direct
information about workers’ post-unemployment welfare, such as post-unemployment
occupational tenure, match quality at these new jobs, or the question of whether
workers are more satisfied with their new occupations.
Assessing the value of the occupational changes facilitated by UI can be a future
avenue of research. One potential reason why post-unemployment wage levels are not
affected by UI extensions in this study – while occupational choices are – is because
of how the current study has defined wage growth. Wage growth is measured by the
difference between wages during the final year in the previous occupation and wages
during the first year in the new one. Even if individuals find a better occupational
match by changing job tasks, the monetary payoffs may not be immediate when
they change job tasks completely, because they may yet lack valuable task-specific
experience.
Moreover, observations on occupational choice across a longer span of time might
afford a better understanding of post-unemployment occupational tenure. Using
the task-based occupation data, with the measure for the direction of occupational
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movement in hand, we can evaluate how an individual’s professional focus – as
measured by job task type – is evolving over time.
In both cases, long-panel data would allow researchers to ascertain whether there
were any long-term benefit to task changes. These, and any further evaluations for
post-unemployment welfare in a context of occupational change, are left for future
studies.
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Table 2.1: Average Task Intensity of Major Occupation Groups
Abstract Routine Manual
Managerial and professional specialty 5.558 3.682 0.980
Technical, sales, and administrative support 2.559 4.801 0.506
Service 1.629 2.803 1.512
Precision production, craft, and repair 1.955 6.655 1.879
Operators, fabricators, and laborers 1.165 4.792 1.788
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Table 2.2: Treatment Status and EUC Benefit Durations (Weeks) by State and Law
11/17/91 2/8/92 6/14/92 3/6/93 10/2/93 Dev. from
P.L.102-182 P.L. 102-244 P.L.102-318 P.L.103-6 P.L.103-152 Tier 2
Tier 1 13 26 20 10 7
Tier 2 20 33 26 15 13
Arkansas 13 33 20 10 7 49
20(2/2/92)
California 13 33 26 15 13 7
20(1/5/92)
Connecticut 20 33 26 10 7 18
20(11/1/92)
Massachusetts 20 33 26 10 7 31
20(8/2/92)
Michigan 20 33 26 10 7 19
20(10/25/92)
Mississippi 20 33 20 10 7 51
26(2/16/92)
Nevada 13 26 20 10 7 55
33(3/8/92)
26(6/6/92)
New Jersey 20 33 26 10 7 15
20(11/22/92) 15(3/7/93)
10(6/13/93)
New York 13 26 26 10 7 47
33(2/16/92) 20(7/12/92)
Oregon 13 33 26 15 7 26
20(1/12/92) 20(9/27/92) 10(7/11/92) 13(2/26/94)
26(1/31/93)
Pennsylvania 13 33 26 10 7 39
20(1/26/92) 20(8/16/92) 15(3/21/93)
10(6/20/93)
Rhode Island 20 33 26 15 7 0
13(1/16/94)
Washington 13 33 26 15 7 41
20(2/2/92) 20(7/4/92) 10(6/27/93)
West Virginia 20 33 26 15 13 0
Source: Emergency Unemployment Compensation: the 1990’s Experience, Revised Edition,
U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration,VI Occasional Paper
99-4. January 1999. Data on Puerto Rico and Virgin Islands are not available. Maine,
Vermont, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming are
excluded as SIPP does not provide unique state identifiers.
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics
Mean S.D. Observations
Worker Characteristics
Age 32.089 10.806 4,627
Education 12.264 2.737 4,627
Black 0.109 0.312 4,627
Net liquid assets 17280.31 72502.38 4,627
Pre-unemployment
ln wage 5.520 0.854 4,502
Abstract task 2.334 2.063 4,627
Routine task 4.340 2.238 4,627
Manual task 1.700 1.474 4,627
Post-layoff
Search duration 13.857 13.424 4,627
ln wage 5.677 0.764 3,452
Abstract task 2.221 1.979 4,627
Routine task 4.280 2.236 4,627
Manual task 1.714 1.477 4,627
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics by Treatment Status τb
τb = 0 τb = 1
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Difference t-stat
ln wage 5.488 0.839 5.584 0.881 -0.096 -3.525
Distance 10.491 14.842 11.390 16.149 -0.899 -1.852
Age 32.235 10.895 31.722 10.617 0.513 1.495
Education 12.244 2.685 12.300 2.865 -0.055 -0.226
Black 0.128 0.334 0.071 0.256 0.057 5.821
Search duration 13.003 12.540 15.202 14.208 -2.198 -5.279
Net liquid assets 13,293 55,484 26,149 99,658 -12,856 -5.549
Abstract task 2.325 2.044 2.388 2.131 -0.063 -0.961
Routine task 4.336 2.226 4.290 2.265 0.046 0.649
Manual task 1.703 1.473 1.676 1.484 0.028 0.586
Unemployment rate 6.567 1.192 7.935 1.421 -1.368 -33.869
Signal 0.000 0.699 0.00 0.712 0.000 0.000
N 3,029 1,473
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Table 2.5: Summary Statistics by Treatment Status τs
τs = 0 τs = 1
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Difference t-stat
ln wage 5.492 0.844 5.596 0.879 -0.104 -3.572
Distance 10.515 14.905 11.552 16.302 -1.037 -1.999
Age 32.079 10.852 32.036 10.678 0.043 0.117
Education 12.299 2.656 12.161 2.984 0.137 1.472
Black 0.121 0.327 0.075 0.264 0.046 4.372
Search duration 13.252 12.748 15.061 14.144 -1.809 -4.058
Net liquid assets 14,196 61,375 26,885 98,777 -12,689 -5.119
Abstract task 2.239 2.050 2.393 2.135 -0.064 -0.912
Routine task 4.340 2.235 4.268 2.251 0.072 0.946
Manual task 1.696 1.478 1.691 1.475 0.004 0.087
Unemployment rate 6.636 1.200 8.092 1.461 -1.456 -33.681
Signal 0.000 0.705 0.000 0.699 0.000 -0.000
N 3,330 1,172
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Table 2.6: Effects of UI on Post-Unemployment Wage Growth
τb τs
No controls Full controls No controls Full controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τ 0.031 0.041 0.0023 0.035
(0.039) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
Search durations -0.0005 -0.0004
(weeks) (0.002) (0.002)
N 1,785 1,785 1,785 1,785
All specifications control for age and age squared. Full controls includes search durations
(weeks), years of education, race dummy, and household net liquidity wealth (quartiles). τb
and τs indicate the treatment status; an eligibility for tier 1 UI extensions. Standard errors
clustered by state in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.7: Effects of UI on Post-Unemployment Occupational Changes
τb τs
No controls Full controls No controls Full controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τ 1.848∗∗ 1.150 1.949∗∗ 1.658∗∗
(0.776) (0.773) (0.832) (0.825)
Search durations 0.205∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(weeks) (0.031) (0.031)
N 1,785 1,785 1,785 1,785
All specifications control for age and age squared. Full controls includes search durations
(weeks), years of education, race dummy, and household net liquidity wealth (quartiles). τb
and τs indicate the treatment status; an eligibility for tier 1 UI extensions. Standard errors
clustered by state in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.8: Difference in Differences in Occupational Distance by Treatment Status
T Control Treatment Difference
0 10.805 11.405 0.600
(15.190) (15.552)
τb 1 10.221 11.617 1.396
(14.566) (16.894)
DID 0.796
0 10.861 11.315 0.454
(15.270) (15.358)
τs 1 10.227 11.792 1.565
(14.547) (17.229)
DID 1.111
T = 0 indicates before EUC is implemented, and T = 1 indicates post-EUC periods.
Standard deviations in parenthesis.
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Quartiles for household net liquidity is used to measure liquid asset levels. Standard errors
clustered by state in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Residuals from this equation is the productivity signal from the pre-unemployment occupa-
tions. The regression is controlled by year and state specific effects, and years of education.
Standard errors clustered by state in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.12: Matching Estimation
Nearest neighbor matching Propensity score matching
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τb τs τb τs
ATE 1.284∗ 1.333∗ 1.649∗∗ 1.855∗∗
(0.748) (0.796) (0.817) (0.889)
N 2,403 2,403 2,403 2,403
Matching estimators for the average treatment effects on occupational changes between
pre- and post-unemployment occupations. The number of match is 1. Standard errors in
parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 2.13: Assessing Unconfoundedness:
Estimates of Average Treatment Effects for Pseudo Outcomes
Nearest neighbor matching Propensity score matching
(1) (2) (3) (4)
τb τs τb τs
ATE -0.525 -0.383 -0.042 -0.042
(0.815) (0.881) (0.814) (0.875)
N 2,099 2,099 2,099 2,099
Matching estimators for the average treatment effects on the pseudo outcomes; occupational
changes between pre- and post-unemployment occupations before the EUC is implemented.
The number of match is 1.
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Distance measures occupational changes between pre- and post-unemployment occupations.
Quartiles for household net liquidity is used to measure liquid asset levels. Standard errors
clustered by state in parentheses. The regression is controlled by year specific fixed effects.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Figure 2.1: Variation in Total Weeks of UI Benefits Available
A. Maximum and Minimum Across States
B. Mean and Standard Deviation Across States
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Since the pioneering work by Farber and Gibbons (1996) that put Spence (1981)
to empirical test, a sizable literature has now developed on testing the presence of
the signaling value of education by exploring the presence of employer learning in the
labor market. Owing to its simple setup and testable predictions, many variations
of the model have now been developed and studied1. These models all assume that
employers may use schooling attainment and other readily-observable characteristics
to predict worker productivity and that employers might respond by resetting wages
as the true productivity of their workers is revealed over the course of their careers.
The model has two key predictions. One, the importance on wage of ability measures
1One such variation is used to test the existence of statistical discrimination in the labor market:
see Altonji (2005); Altonji and Pierret (2001) for earlier works using the employer learning models.
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that are correlated with productivity but not observed by employers should increase
with experience, as firms learn about their workers’ true productivity. Two, the
importance on wage of readily observable measures, such as years of schooling or
race, should decline with years of worker experience if such measures initially serve
as signals of abilities.
In this paper, we ask whether the role of employer learning in the wage-setting
process varies by the tasks being performed on the job. In doing so, we address how
choice of occupation in a given period affects occupational mobility in the following
period. The literature on employer learning has mostly been concerned with testing
the presence of employer learning at a given level of educational attainment, but such
an approach implicitly assumes that the rate of employer learning is independent of
the type of job tasks. Studies that consider the role that job task plays with respect
to the speed of employer learning have thus far lacked discussion of the endogeneity
in occupational choices.
We build on a theoretical model of Altonji (2005), in which workers choose
occupations based on their expectations about their own skills and in which each
occupation reveals different amounts of information about their skills. We extend the
model to allow multi-dimensional skills and tasks. The model predicts a three-way
interaction term of skills, tasks, and experience to be positive, meaning that the effect
of uncertain ability on wage growth increases with intensity of job tasks, because
intensive job tasks reveal more information about workers’ skill levels. The model
also has implications for occupational choice: workers choose their occupations, given
117
CHAPTER 3. EMPLOYER LEARNING OF MULTI-DIMENSIONAL ABILITY
noisy information about their skill sets. Thus, the task intensity of a worker’s job
can be a determinant for occupational mobility over the lifecycle when productivity
signals vary by task intensity.
We depart from the standard employer learning literature in interpreting different
measures of skills as a noisy measure of ability. Typically, in the literature, true
productivity is assumed to be composed of four additive parts: those observable to
econometricians only, to firms only, to both econometricians and firms, and to neither.
One of the difficulties in implementing the model lies in finding a measure that is
observed only by econometricians: AFQT scores are almost always used as one such
measure but without much defense. With our definition of ability, the noisiness of
the skill measure initially observed by the firm and the skill measures used in the
wage regression suggest the sign of key parameters in the model, while upholding
the model’s key implications. Rather than having to rely on assumptions about the
observability of a skill measure to assign parameters a priori, our definition allows
for inferring whether a measure of skill, or a proxy of it, is used in the wage setting
process ex post.
To test the model implications in a multi-dimensional skill setting, we take a direct
measure of task intensities for three-digit occupation groups. These measures are
created by taking answers to relevant questions from the Occupational Information
Network (O*NET), as used in earlier studies. By not relying on level of education,
which is positively correlated with task intensities, the role of task type within any
given educational group can still be tested.
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For our main analysis, we use data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth 1979 (NLSY79). We focus on two task measures – abstract tasks and social
tasks – and for three mutually exclusive educational groups – high school graduates,
some college, and college graduates. We find that employer learning depends on the
type of tasks in a given job, especially for cognitive skills, as well as that the degree
of task-based employer learning varies across educational groups. In particular, our
analyses show that for college graduates, cognitive tasks seem to play a key role in
employer learning, while social tasks are more important for high school graduates.
One concern that arises in using current job task as an explanatory variable
in a log wage equation is endogeneity. The decision to change jobs involves the
arrival of information that is correlated with the worker’s productivity. Hence, job
switching may be positively correlated with a productivity shock. Due to this possible
complication of job switching, the literature relies on estimating the presence of
employer learning conditional on the first job only. We first address the endogeneity
using means that are typically used elsewhere in the literature: controlling for the
first job. We then turn to an instrumental variable approach, using the Markov
property of Bayesian learning, where the previous periods’ occupation is used as
an instrument. We instrumentalize the first period’s occupation using workers’
occupational aspirations in 1982.
We build on a number of previous papers that study the importance of educa-
tion’s signaling value by testing the presence of employer learning or evaluating the
evidence of statistical discrimination in wage structures (Farber and Gibbons (1996);
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Altonji and Pierret (2001); Arcidiacono et al. (2010); Lang and Manove (2011); Mansour
(2012); Kahn and Lange (2014); Light and McGee (2015)). Light and McGee (2015)
brings the “importance of skills” measure from O*NET for each of the seven com-
ponent scores in the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) in the
NLSY79. Using the pre-market skills proxied by the ASVAB scores and the skill
importance measures, Light and McGee (2015) estimates nonstructural parameters
that are related to screening (an employer’s ability to screen for skills before hiring)
and learning for different types of workers (i.e., for high school and college graduates,
and for blue- and white-collar workers), and for skills’ differing types and levels of
importance. They find that different skill types display distinct tradeoffs between
learning and screening. However, they also find that the extent of employer learning
does not vary significantly across skill type or worker type.
Our empirical analysis is closely related to the reduced-form analysis introduced in
Light and McGee (2015), but we take a different approach in order to test the effect
of task-intensity on the speed of employer learning. We exploit proxies for cognitive
and social skills from the NLSY79 and corresponding task-intensity measures for the
two skill types; these task-intensity measures are constructed by Autor and Dorn
in Autor and Dorn (2013) and by Deming as used in Deming (2017). We find that
task intensities are important factors in determining employer learning and wage
progressions, and they have different impacts by worker type, namely for high school
vs. college graduates.
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3.2 Employer Learning Model with Occupation-Specific Job
Task
We build on a theoretical model by Altonji (2005), which builds on a standard
employer learning model (e.g., Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret
(2001)), and we extend the framework to allow multi-dimensional skills and tasks.2 We
formally further the development of an idea previously developed in Light and McGee
(2015), that one’s productivity at different jobs that require different sets of skills
reveals information about said worker’s true skills at different rates. This is because
the sensitivity of output to a given worker’s skill should depend on how intensively
that skill is used in the job: for example, performing a hypothetical job that requires
no social skills should not reveal any information to an employer about the worker’s
true social skills. This is consistent with Sanders (2014) and Bahk (2020), who find
that workers learn about their skills by changing to new jobs that require different
combinations of tasks.
We assume, as in Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001), that
a worker and employers in the labor market have symmetric information about the
worker i’s true skill level qi = (q1,i, ..., qJ,i) where qj , j = 1, ..., J denotes distinct skill-
set, such as cognitive and social skills.3 Therefore, all separations between workers
2There is fast-growing literature on human capital formation and development, highlighting the
importance of multi-dimensional skills in determining various outcomes, including years of schooling
and labor market productivity. See, for example, Heckman and Rubinstein (2001), Papageorge et al.
(2019), Deming (2017), among many.
3The employer learning literature assumes symmetric information and also assumes that AFQT
score is unobserved to employers in the market. This in turn implies that workers also do not
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and firms and job mobilities are efficient and agreed upon by the agents. We make
an additional assumption that qi is time-invariant, i.e., there is no human capital
accumulation over time and the evolution of wages entirely reflects leaning and changes
in occupations. The productivity y, given a time-invariant vector of true skill levels,
T, and a vector of task intensities performed in a given job, Tit = (T1,i,t, ..., TJ,i,t) for
an individual i at time t is:
yit = µqi + TitAq
′
i −TitBT′it. (3.1)
given an 1× J matrix qi and J × J diagonal matrices A and B, which are parameters





(µjqj,i + AjTj,i,tqj,i −BjT 2j,i,t) (3.2)
where Aj and Bj are jj − th elements of matrices A and B, respectively. We assume
Aj > 0 and Bj > 0 for all j. In the subsequent discussion, we will omit i subscripts.
The first of these implies that workers who are more skilled at jth skill have a
comparative advantage in jobs that require a higher intensity of that task compared
to other workers. This is because the higher Tj is, the more sensitive y is to change in
qj. The latter assumption means that choosing jobs with more intensive tasks comes
with higher productivity costs and the costs may differ for the two tasks. Lastly,
observe their own AFQT scores. Guvenen et al. (2020) defends this assumption by arguing that
only a limited amount of information about AFQT scores is revealed to the test takers.
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given the setup, y is independently determined by the two tasks and worker skill in
each dimension.
We assume that agents observe skill-specific productivity signals gjt for each skill
j and each period t = 1, 2, ..., n. For example, agents learn how good a worker is at
cognitive tasks and social tasks separately. The signal is determined by a worker’s
skill q and choice of occupation T , and the idiosyncratic noise ε. Thus, the amount
of new information that the agents gain for each skill may vary depending on the
task levels in each skill dimension.
gjt = Tjtqj + εjt, εjt ∼ N(0, σ2εj), (3.3)
Given a productivity signal gjt, the mean and variance of an agent’s belief about
qj at t can be written as































where q̂jt represents agents’ expectation about worker’s jth skill, and σ2ηjt denotes the
123
CHAPTER 3. EMPLOYER LEARNING OF MULTI-DIMENSIONAL ABILITY
variance of agents’ belief at time t.
Equation (3.3) implies that as task Tj increases, the signal provides more valuable
information about a worker’s skill qj. Therefore, the learning speed depends on the
relative information content of the agent’s initial belief and on the new information
gained through learning as shown in (3.4) and (3.5).
We assume the labor market is competitive. Firms infer workers’ skill q and then
pay according to workers’ expected productivity each period. Workers choose an
occupation, i.e., a vector of task levels Tt, each period to maximize their expected
lifetime wage, given their belief about their own skills. We may reach the simple
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because En−1(q̂jn) = En−1(En(qj|gjn)) = En−1(qj) = q̂jn−1. Therefore, T ∗jn−1 =
a
2b
q̂jn−1 and similarly, T ∗jt =
a
2b
q̂jt for all t.
Equations (3.4) and (3.5) imply that workers with low T learn more slowly due
to noisier signals. Assuming that var(η0) and var(ε) are identical for different groups
of people (for example, high school and college graduates), the group with the higher
average task level will resolve skill uncertainty at a faster rate and experience lower
levels of occupational mobility over their career. However, the model may have a
mixed prediction about occupational mobility if the variances of initial belief or the
pure (signal) noise varies for different groups of workers. Given that task intensities
are fixed, the learning speed is slower when the variance of initial belief or of signal is
higher.
The model implies that there are two channels through which task levels T affect
wages. First, wage changes more sensitively according to worker skill at higher
task levels because of its increasing sensitivity on outputs. The second effect is
through learning; with higher T, more information is revealed through more precise
productivity signals. Therefore, wage growth is more heavily dependent on skills
when workers have higher occupations.
3.2.1 Employer Learning Framework
Farber and Gibbons (1996) and subsequently Altonji and Pierret (2001) develop
a framework to test for employer learning. One key assumption is that a worker’s
true productivity can be decomposed into four additive components. There are four
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types of measures of qj : (i) observable to econometricians but not to the firm (zj), (ii)
observable to the firm but not to econometricians (hj), (iii) observable to both parties
(sj), and (iv) observable to neither (ej).4 In particular, omitting j subscript, as the
original models concern one dimensional skills, the true skill of a worker is written as
q = rs+ αh+ Γz + e. (3.8)
and employers form expectations of factors they cannot observe (z, e), given the
factors that they can observe (s, h). Econometricians, on the other hand, do not
observe h, which firms use to construct expectations about a worker’s productivity
and have to infer about it using what they can observe: z. That is, the true wage
generating process is: wt = β0 + β1s + β2h + êt + ζt, where êt is Et(e|g1, ..., gt) and
econometricians can only run regressions of the following form: wt = γ0+γ1s+γ2z+νt.
Since workers’ wages depend on ability measures that econometricians do not
observe, coefficients on z in wage regressions that econometricians run are misspecified.
In particular, the regression suffers from omitted-variable bias. If employer learning
occurs, there will be a time-varying component of the omitted-variable bias because
employers use more information to form expectations and determine wages as time
passes. The test of employer learning centers around this idea.
One of the difficulties in implementing the outlined test is to find measures that
are unobserved by the employer, and to the workers under symmetric information
4The two papers differ in that Farber and Gibbons (1996) develops a method to test for employer
learning, while Altonji and Pierret (2001) builds on that model to test for statistical discrimination.
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assumption. Naturally, one criticism of this method is whether AFQT scores, which
are widely used measure for z, are in fact unobserved. Further, equation (3.8) is also
restrictive in assuming that the four components of q are related in a particular way.
Instead of following the conventional definition of q, we use lessons from the
measurement error model 5 and assume that s, h, and z are all noisy measures of
the true ability q. This setup keeps the intuition and strategy used in a standard
employer learning model without having to search for a measure of z.
The following model illustrates the strategy to test employer learning and statistical
discrimination under our definition of q. Let skill measures be:
h = q + εh
z = q + εz
where εh and εz are random noise, and assume that s is the same for everyone. Further















1 q + ε
F
2 .
5For an overview of the empirical application of measurement error models, see Hu (2017).
Cunha et al. (2010)
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, and δE1,2 =
δF1
V ar(εz)
. Both estimates suffer from attenuation
bias, but the magnitude of the bias changes across period due to the second-period
reduction in noise about true skill. In the above case, bias moves away from 0.
Similarly, if z = h in the above example – that is, if the noise of the included variable
is highly correlated with measures used by firms to set wages – we can get estimates
that move toward 0 as t increases.
The implication of Altonji and Pierret (2001)model that years of schooling coeffi-
cient, (a measure that firms can easily observe) will decrease over time and the AFQT
coefficient (a measure that firms do not observe) will increase over time when learning
occurs. Formally, Altonji and Pierret (2001) propose the following regression model
to test for employer learning and statistical discrimination:
wit = β0 + βSSi + βSZSiXit + βZ,tZi + βXXit + βZXZiXit + εit, (3.9)
where Xi indicates years of experience. A negative βSZ means that firms initially
used Si, an observable characteristic that is a noisy measure of the true ability q,
and thus indicates statistical discrimination based on Si. Likewise, a positive βZX
indicates that firms learn over time about workers’ true ability.
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Task-Dependent Employer Learning
Our goal is to test whether the role of employer learning in the wage-setting
process varies by the intensity of the tasks being performed on the job. In order to
test this, we augment equation (3.9) to include task intensity measures:
wit = βaSi+β2Zi+β3Si×Xit+β4Zi×Xit+β5Zi×TZit +β6Zi×Xit×TZit +εit. (3.10)
The task-specific employer learning model in section 3.2 implies that β6 > 0. If
task-dependent learning occurs, high T increases the accuracy of the productivity
signal of the worker’s true ability q, therefore strengthening the relationship between
Z and wage growth. In Altonji (2005), he makes a similar argument, where T is
replaced with S. The reasoning behind his using S is that S is positively correlated
with task intensity level, which leads to a greater flow of information, whereas we use
the direct measure of task intensity T instead of S. We will discuss details of this
model in section 3.3.2.
3.3 Empirical Evidence
We use the NLSY 79, widely used in the employer learning scholarship, to test
the theoretical implications discussed in section 3.2. We first discuss the dataset used,
then test for employer learning using an extension of the standard employer learning
model discussed in section 3.2.1. We then explore the model prediction on choice of
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occupation and occupational mobility. In section 3.3.4, we discuss the endogeneity
issue.
3.3.1 NLSY 79 Dataset
The data used in the study are drawn from the 1979–2004 waves of the NLSY79.
We only use these earlier waves for two reasons. First, the use of the 1979–2004
waves is consistent with earlier studies, in particular Arcidiacono et al. (2010), which
subsequent papers in statistical discrimination and employer learning often replicate.
Second, we follow Arcidiacono et al. (2010) in restricting our attention to the part
of the distribution where the relationship between log wages, AFQT, and potential
experience are linear, which corresponds to experience levels less than 13 years.
The main analytic sample is thus restricted to 25,692 individual–year observations
for whom the above-mentioned variables are observed. Our sample is identical to
that of Arcidiacono et al. (2010), with the exception of our inclusion of the “some
college” educational group.
The key variables used in this analysis are constructed as follows. We focus on
two dimensions of abilities: cognitive and non-cognitive (social) skills, which are not
observed by both employers and workers. To measure cognitive task intensity, we
use the abstract task measure constructed by Autor and Dorn (2013) using the data
from the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). The abstract task measure is the
average of two DOT variables, “direction control and planning” and “GED Math,”
measuring managerial, mathematical, and formal reasoning requirements. We use the
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AFQT score from the NLSY for the relevant cognitive skill measure for the abstract
task. As in Arcidiacono et al. (2010), we use the standardized AFQT score for each
age at which the test was taken. For social tasks, we take a measure constructed in
Deming (2017) using the Occupational Information Network (O*NET) which is the
successor of the DOT. The social task measure is the average of four O*NET variables:
“coordination,” “negotiation,” “persuasion,” and “social perceptiveness.” Non-cognitive
skill, then, is measured using the normalized average of the Rotter Locus of Control
and the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, which are also used by Heckman et al. (2006)
and Deming (2017).
Table 3.1 summarizes the individuals who compose the analytic sample. Column
(1) does so for the full sample, and Columns (2)–(4) do so separately for individuals’
educational achievement. In most subsequent analyses, we report estimates separately
for high school graduates and 4-year college graduates, following Arcidiacono et al.
(2010), who showed that falsely aggregating the two groups could lead to bias in the
estimates. Further, we include a ‘some college’ group, which consists of individuals
who have enrolled in college but did not obtain a 4-year college degree. Our rationale
for adding this group is the fact that about half of all students who enroll in college
in the U.S. eventually drop out (Hotz et al. (2018)); given this group’s size, the
signaling value of the partial completion of college merits analysis. Our choice to
include them is also due to recent research that explicitly notes that individuals with
some college – but less than a four-year degree – have socioeconomic trajectories
that closely resemble those of high school graduates (Lundberg et al. (2016)). If
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this is true, we should observe similar patterns of employer learning for high school
graduates and for individuals with some college education.
Table 3.1 shows differences in initial cognitive ability as measured by AFQT and in
job tasks denoted “Abstract” across the three educational groups. College graduates,
compared to high school graduates, have AFQT scores that are about 1 standard
deviation higher, and the average AFQT score of the “some college” group lies about
halfway between the other groups. It is also noteworthy that both the social and
the abstract task requirements at jobs increase with education, although the initial
distribution of social scores across the three groups does not appear to vary. The
table thus suggest that individuals with different educations work in occupations that
require different sets of skills. In particular, those with more years of education, on
average, work in occupations that have higher abstract and social task demands.
This feature in the data motivates our analysis. Given the predictions of our
model, the higher task intensity observed for college graduates suggests that the
slower learning with respect to high school graduates’ cognitive ability (something
widely found in the literature) may partly result from high school graduates’ working
in occupations that are less cognitive-skill-intensive and from the finding that, on
average, college graduates have a comparative advantage with respect to social and
abstract tasks. In this case, such a difference in learning may occur within an
educational attainment group.
In Figure 3.1, we explore how average task intensities change with years of potential
experience. The figure shows that average abstract and social task intensities increase
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with years of education and with years of potential experience. Consistent with Table
3.1, average task intensities for both abstract and social job contents are highest for
those who hold bachelor’s degrees and lowest for high school graduates. The job
contents of the “some college” group lies between the other two educational attainment
groups for all levels of potential experience and are statistically different from the
contents of the other two groups. Figure 3.1 also shows that both the abstract and
social contents in a given job increase with experience, on average.
The difference in the task intensities across these groups remains stable over time.
Given the difference in the initial distribution of these skills, this stability has an
important implication in addressing human capital accumulation. Namely, given
the task skill measures, initial skill distribution, and choice of job tasks outlined in
3.2, this suggests that if human capital accumulation exists, the degree of learning
does not depend much on years of schooling. This is an important insight because
the employer learning model assumes that additional human capital is orthogonal to
observed skill measures; hence we can attribute changes in coefficient over time to
changes in firms’ information set.
Figure 3.2 shows the relationship between initial skills and career progression in
terms of job tasks, by plotting how the abstract contents of jobs change over time.
The top-left panel of Figure 3.2 shows that people with higher AFQT scores work
in jobs that have higher abstract contents from the start and that the difference
in the task intensiveness grows over time. Interpreting this pattern in the context
of the employer learning literature, the plot suggests both that employers are able
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to screen employees early on and that they also learn about their employees over
time. Additionally, the relatively small movements in task intensity for the college
graduates observed in Panel (d) and increasing task content in Panel (b) are consistent
with previous findings of revelation of ability at the start of one’s career for college
graduates but not for high school graduates.
As our theoretical model predicts, the plots indeed suggest that occupational
choice can also reveal employer learning, in addition to wage, the latter of which is
primarily used in this strand of literature. Also, it highlights one important limitation
of the employer learning model: the model cannot distinguish the effect of human
capital accumulation from the effect of employer learning. Through most of this
paper, we will use the term employer learning without distinguishing it from the
idea of human capital accumulation. Separation of these two effects requires stronger
assumptions in the form of human capital accumulation function and the method of
learning, or additional data on ability measures. We do not address these.6
Figure 3.2 also reveals three empirical patterns. First, with the exception of
the “some college” group, the highest type and the lowest type appear always to
distinguish themselves from others: this is consistent with the theoretical results
of Lang and Manove (2011). This finding also highlights the possibility that initial
occupational choice can be used as a signaling channel, in addition to years of schooling.
Moreover, it reveals a potential mechanism through which employer learning might
6Farber and Gibbons (1996) address this. find initial skill-human capital accumulation comple-
mentarity. The true results would be weaker than what we find.
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occur; perhaps employer learning occurs through workers’ repeated signaling efforts
throughout their careers, whereby each worker exerts effort to signal productivity
(Kaya (2009)). Second, the degree of employer learning appears to vary with the
initial skill level, especially for high school graduates. Third, there appears to be
considerable noise in the occupational choices of the “some college” group, but after 5
years, cognitive task intensity and AFQT score measures align.
Figure 3.2 shows that most of the changes in job contents occur among individuals
in the middle of the education–AFQT distribution. The abstract task content of
high school graduates in the lowest quintile does not change much over time, and
the abstract task intensity stays relatively flat for college graduates in higher AFQT
quintiles. By contrast, task intensities for other groups is generally shown to increase
over time, a pattern that, in turn, contrasts with the implications of models of human
capital investment that view jobs as a combination of different skills, as formalized in
Cavounidis and Lang (2020). Under the model, people would overinvest in the skills
that they use most intensively, meaning that we would observe steeper changes in task
intensity within the intersection of the highest-quantile-AFQT and highest-education
groups.
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3.3.2 Testing Employer Learning Using Wage Regressions
We estimate the following equation to test for the presence of employer learning













6 Zi×Xit×TZit + εit (3.11)
where Si is educational attainment, Zi is a vector of skill measures that consists of
AFQT scores and social scores7, Xit is years of potential experience at time t, and
TZit is a vector representing job contents. We also include a vector of demographic
controls that include region of residence, a binary indicator of urban residence, and
race.
Assuming Zi and TZit to be scalars to fix ideas, the test of task-dependent employer
learning constitutes testing β6 > 0. The analysis in section 3.2 suggests that the effect
of Z on wage growth increases with TZ , due to an increase in information flow, with
larger TZ . If task-dependent learning occurs, a high Z increases TZ , which makes
the signal of the true ability q more accurate, thus strengthening the relationship
between Z and w. This argument is similar to that made in Altonji (2005), if Z is
replaced with S. In his model, the goal was to test the signaling value of education
when firms differ in their production technology, whereas we are interested in testing
the signaling value of job tasks in such a market.
7These skills would constitute skill measures unobserved to firms but observed to econometrician
in a classic employer learning model, while such distinction is not needed under our framework.
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The sign of the coefficient estimates of β2, β4 are also of interest. Following
the assumption in the employer learning literature that Zi contains part of the
productivity-relevant characteristics that firms find harder to observe, a positive
β2 coefficient indicates that a portion of those characteristics are revealed at the
time of labor market entrance. The coefficient on the interaction term of skills and
experience, β4, shows whether the importance of the hard-to-observe skill measure, Zi
changes over time. If Zi affects productivity and if employer learning occurs, then we
would expect the coefficient on β4 to be positive. The magnitude of these coefficients,
however, is not readily interpretable. As discussed in section 3.2, the test of employer
learning relies on the change in the coefficients’ bias over time.
The analysis in this section is most closely related to the analyses in Mansour
(2012) and Light and McGee (2015), which study the role in employer learning of
a worker’s first job after the completion of education. Mansour (2012) investigates
this by dividing the jobs using the Census 2-digit occupation code and analyzing the
changes in residual variances across these occupations. Light and McGee (2015)’s
approach is closer to our paper: they study the role of task intensities of the first
job in revealing information about workers’ true productivity. We differ in that
we use the information of all CPS jobs. Furthermore, the two papers mentioned
use the characteristics of the first job, due to endogeneity concerns associated with
job-switching behavior. We will address this in section 3.3.4.
Table 3.2 presents OLS estimates of the regression model in equation (3.11).
Columns (1)–(3) report coefficient estimates for the main analytic sample, Columns
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(4)–(6) do so for white people in the sample, and Columns (7)–(9) do so for black
people in the sample. Within each column, we report coefficient estimates separately
for high school graduates, the “some college” group, and college graduates. For
abstract task, comparison of the first two coefficients on Columns (1) and (3) shows a
significant, positive coefficient for AFQT for college graduates; a significant, positive
coefficient on AFQT × T for high school graduates; and insignificant coefficients for
the other two groups. This is consistent with results in Arcidiacono et al. (2010).
The estimate of β6 of abstract task for college graduates is positive and signifi-
cant, as theory suggests. The corresponding estimate for high school graduates is
significant and negative, contrary to what theory suggests. One possibility is that
high school graduates choose jobs wherein they hold a comparative advantage over
college graduates, and from there they increase in the task content of these job, which
tend to involve fewer cognitive tasks.8
The coefficients on “social task” are negative in all specifications in Columns (1)–(3).
That type of task is valued more over time, as indicated by the positive coefficients of
the interaction term ST ×X. One possibility is that some degree of complementarity
and substitutability of abstract and social tasks, given firms’ production technologies,
drive this. The coefficients for social skill and its interaction with experience are
insignificant both for high school graduates and for college graduates. The “some
8We suspect that the type of skill they choose is manual tasks; regression of wage on job tasks,
including manual tasks, shows that the sign of the manual task coefficient is positive and significant
for high school graduates and less so for college graduates. The opposite pattern holds for abstract
tasks. We include “abstract task” and not “manual task” here because the NLSY lacks credible
measures of manual skills.
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college” group exhibits evidence of learning of cognitive skill and early revelation of
social skills. Unlike for either of the other groups, the β6 coefficients for both of the
abilities – cognitive and social – remain insignificant.
Table 3.2 also supports the learning story for white and black college graduates,
but the coefficient on AFQT is significant only for black people. Given that the mean
of abstract task intensity for college graduates is above 6, the estimates suggest that
task-based learning occurs for white college graduates. For black college graduates,
firms appear to learn about cognitive skill as proxied by the AFQT test.
3.3.3 Choice of Occupation and Revelation of Ability
The literature on employer learning and statistical discrimination is largely silent on
the choice of occupation and its role in the revelation of ability. The original model of
employer learning considered a labor market wherein firms would have homogeneous
technology and symmetric information. Much of the literature shares this assumption;
however, Altonji (2005) and Mansour (2012) are two notable exceptions. The first
considers the choice of occupation theoretically; the latter informally suggests that
the choice of occupation may lead to differences in speed of learning across different
occupations.
The model in section 3.2 predicts that the initial occupational choice, and each
subsequent choice of occupation, can signal ability known to workers up to time t.
Because the precision of the signal of ability is stronger when task intensity is high,
changes in occupational task intensity are more strongly related to task intensity in
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the previous period and to the observed ability measure conditional on the experience.
Table 3.3 tests this prediction by observing how the distance of occupational tasks
changes across periods (|Tt − Tt−1|). Column (1) shows that higher task intensity in
the previous period is associated with a smaller change. This might arise because
information about skills might be revealed early for people with very intensive jobs,
and these individuals are not likely to move afterwards. The difference in occupational
mobility by black people that appears in Column (1) is explained by difference in
AFQT. Column (4) adds an interaction term of AFQT and AbstractTask to the
specification. The results show that both of these variables separately explain task
mobility. Repeating the analysis for each educational subgroup in Columns (5)–(7) is
consistent with this. College graduates, who have the highest average level of AT are
less likely to make job switches that would demand a large change in cognitive task
intensity, while high school graduates and “some college” workers show more sizable
changes.
3.3.4 Controlling For Endogeneity
Given that occupation at time t is a choice made by the worker, it is likely that
the decision to change jobs involves the arrival of information that correlates with
the productivity of the worker. This correlation could bias our coefficient estimate of
β6, as those who observe a high productivity shock for a particular occupation may
choose that occupation.
We control for potential bias arising from this source of endogeneity using the
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previous period’s task intensity as an instrument. The use of this instrument results
from the assumptions set forth in the employer learning literature. Namely, the error
term εit in (3.10) should be independent of information known at time t− 1. Workers’
task choices depend only on the current belief about skill, as discussed in section 3.2;
thus, Tit−1 is independent with εit. The results are shown in Table 3.4.
Consistent with earlier findings, we observe the presence of learning. The estimated
change in the effect of AFQT over time is positive, but this difference is statistically
insignificant. Taken together, the evidence suggests that employer learning about
cognitive ability occurs even for college graduates and that the speed of learning
varies by job task. The estimates on social skills, on the other hand, suggest that
social skill appeared to be fully revealed at the time of hiring and/or that social skills
do not affect productivity.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we question whether the role of employer learning in the evolution
of wages varies according to the type of task(s) being performed on the job. To allow
for multi-dimensional skills and tasks, we extend a theoretical model of Altonji (2005),
in which each occupation reveals different amounts of information. While Altonji
(2005) suggests employing workers’ education level as a proxy for the difficulty of the
job tasks they perform, we use direct measures of cognitive and social task intensities
for three-digit occupational groups. We test the model prediction that the effect
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of uncertain ability on wage growth increases with task intensity because intensive
job tasks reveal more information about workers’ skill, and we find that employer
learning depends on multi-dimensional tasks. In particular, we find that the effects
of task intensities in learning vary by worker education level; for college graduates,
cognitive tasks seem to play a key role in employer learning, while social tasks are
more important for high school graduates. To address the endogeneity issue that
arises when using the current job task as an explanatory variable, we show consistent
findings from exploiting the previous periods’ occupation and occupational aspiration
as an instrument.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics By Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All HS Grad Some College 4-Yr Degree
Skill and Job Task measures
AFQT 0.20 -0.08 0.41 1.04
(1.00) (0.93) (0.81) (0.59)
Social Score 0.40 0.39 0.41 0.43
Job Task: Social 4.25 3.29 4.47 6.69
(2.74) (2.33) (2.64) (2.22)
Job Task: Abstract 2.73 1.88 2.75 4.97
(2.32) (1.64) (2.20) (2.44)
SES and Demographics
Log of Real Wage 6.77 6.65 6.78 7.14
(0.50) (0.43) (0.47) (0.50)
black 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.17
Year of Birth 1960.68 1960.85 1960.42 1960.26
(2.21) (2.14) (2.23) (2.33)
Education
Years of Education 13.20 12.00 13.78 16.64
(2.28) (0.00) (0.73) (1.13)
HS 0.46 1.00 0.00 0.00
Come College 0.20 0.00 1.00 0.00
4-Year Degree or More 0.23 0.00 0.00 1.00
Region of Residence
Northeast 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.22
North Central 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.29
South 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.34
West 0.14 0.13 0.19 0.15
Urban Residence 0.78 0.74 0.81 0.87
Potential Experience
Potential Experience 6.47 6.61 6.59 6.14
(3.31) (3.30) (3.30) (3.29)
Ages < 25 3.35 3.50 2.94 1.56
(1.76) (1.66) (1.55) (0.91)
Ages 25-30 7.21 8.35 6.95 4.47
(2.51) (1.69) (2.25) (2.02)
Ages 30-35 9.82 11.29 10.15 8.61
(2.24) (1.34) (1.99) (2.18)
Ages > 35 10.11 7.69 9.57 10.44
(2.44) (2.98) (3.03) (2.10)
Actual Experience
Actual Experience 5.62 5.90 5.41 4.79
(3.30) (3.33) (3.17) (3.19)
Ages < 25 2.65 2.80 1.88 0.51
(1.84) (1.74) (1.32) (0.58)
Ages 25-30 6.49 7.60 5.61 3.39
(2.49) (1.72) (1.97) (1.62)
Ages 30-35 9.30 10.67 9.08 7.86
(2.07) (1.41) (1.84) (1.80)
Ages > 35 9.55 7.56 9.20 10.15
(2.58) (3.13) (3.14) (1.80)
Observations 25692 11796 5090 5966
Notes: This table presents means of variables where individual-year observations are the
unit of analysis. Standard deviations for non-binary variables are reported in parenthesis.
HS denotes high school. Job tasks are on a 0-10 scale.
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Panel 3.1 plots conditional means of abstract task intensities by potential experience along
with 95% confidence band. Panel 3.1 plots conditional means of social task intensities by
potential experience.
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Panel 3.2 plots conditional means of abstract task intensities by potential experience by
AFQT quintile of the analytic sample. Panel 3.2 does so for high school graduates. Panel
3.2 and Panel 3.2 do so for some college and college graduates, respectively.
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